192 L. Ed. 2d 609
576 U.S. ___
James OBERGEFELL, et al., Petitioners v. Richard HODGES, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al.; Valeria Tanco, et al., Petitioners v. Bill Haslam, Governor of Tennessee, et al.; April DeBoer, et al., Petitioners v. Rick Snyder, Governor of Michigan, et al.; and Gregory Bourke, et al., Petitioners v. Steve Beshear, Governor of Kentucky.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued April 28, 2015.
Decided June 26, 2015.
Mary L. Bonauto, for the petitioners.
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General, for the United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioners.
John J. Bursch, Grand Rapids, MI, for the respondents.
Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Washington, DC, for the petitioners.
Susan L. Sommer, M. Currey Cook, Omar Gonzalez-Pagan, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., New York, NY, for Henry Petitioners.
James D. Esseks, Steven R. Shapiro, Joshua A. Block, Chase B. Strangio, Ria Tabacco Mar, Louise Melling, American Civil Liberties, Union Foundation, New York, NY, for Obergefell Petitioners.
Alphonse A. Gerhardstein, Counsel of Record, Jennifer L. Branch, Jacklyn Gonzales Martin, Adam Gingold Gerhardstein, Gerhardstein & Branch Co. LPA, Cincinnati, OH, Jon W. Davidson, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Los Angeles, CA, Paul D. Castillo, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Dallas, TX, Camilla B. Taylor, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Chicago, IL, Ellen Essig Katz, Greenberger & Norton, LLP, Cincinnati, OH, for Henry Petitioners.
Freda J. Levenson, Drew S. Dennis, ACLU of Ohio, Inc., Cleveland, OH, for Obergefell Petitioners.
Lisa T. Meeks, Newman & Meeks Co., LPA, Cincinnati, OH, for All Petitioners.
Michael Dewine, Attorney General of Ohio, Eric E. Murphy, Counsel of Record, State Solicitor, Stephen P. Carney, Peter T. Reed, Deputy Solicitors, Columbus, OH, for Respondent.
Abby R. Rubenfeld, Rubenfeld Law Office, PC, Nashville, TN, William L. Harbison, Phillip F. Cramer, J. Scott Hickman, John L. Farringer, Sherrard & Roe, PLC, Nashville, TN, Maureen T. Holland, Holland & Assoc., PC, Memphis, TN, Regina M. Lambert, Knoxville, TN, Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Counsel of Record, Ropes & Gray LLP, Washington, DC, Christopher Thomas Brown, Justin G. Florence, Ropes & Gray LLP, Boston, MA, Shannon P. Minter, David C. Codell, Christopher F. Stoll, Amy Whelan, Asaf Orr, National Center for Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, CA, Paul S. Kellogg, Ropes & Gray LLP, New York, NY, Samira A. Omerovic, Emerson A. Siegle, John T. Dey, Ropes & Gray LLP, Washington, DC, Joshua E. Goldstein, Ropes & Gray LLP, Boston, MA, for Valeria Tanco, et al., Petitioners.
Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General, State of Tennessee, Joseph F. Whalen, Associate Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Martha A. Campbell, Kevin G. Stelling, Deputy Attorneys General, Alexander S. Rieger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Nashville, TN, for William Haslam, et al., Respondents.
Kenneth M. Mogill, Mogill, Posner & Cohen, Lake Orion, MI, Dana M. Nessel, Nessel & Kessel Law, Detroit, MI, Mary L. Bonauto, Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Boston, MA, Carole M. Stanyar, Counsel of Record, Arm Arbor, MI, Robert A. Sedler, Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, MI, for April Deboer, et al., Petitioners.
Bill Schuette, Michigan Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, B. Eric Restuecia, Deputy Solicitor General, Ann Sherman, Assistant Solicitor General, John J. Bursch, Special Assistant Attorney General, Counsel of Record, Lansing, MI, for Richard Snyder, Governor, State of Michigan, in his official capacity, et al., Respondents.
James D. Esseks, Steven R. Shapiro, Joshua A. Block, Chase B. Strangio, Leslie Cooper, Louise Melling, American Civil Liberties, New York, NY, Jeffrey L. Fisher, Brian Wolfman, Stanford Law School, Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Stanford, CA, William E. Sharp, American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, Louisville, KY, Daniel J. Canon, Counsel of Record, Laura E. Landenwich, L. Joe Dunman, Clay Daniel Walton Adams, PLC, Louisville, KY, Shannon Fauver, Dawn Elliott, Fauver Law Office, PLLC, Louisville, KY, for Gregory Bourke, et al., and Timothy Love, et al., Petitioners.
Leigh Gross Latherow, Counsel of Record, William H. Jones, Jr., Gregory L. Monge, VanAntwerp, Monge, Jones, Edwards & McCann, LLP, Ashland, KY, for Steve Beshear, in His Official Capacity as Governor of Kentucky, Respondent.
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a union between one man and one woman. The petitioners, 14 same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are deceased, filed suits in Federal District Courts in their home States, claiming that respondent state officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in another State given full recognition. Each District Court ruled in petitioners? favor, but the Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed.
Held:?The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize a marriage between two people of the same sex when their marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-State. Pp.?3?28.
(a)?Before turning to the governing principles and precedents, it is appropriate to note the history of the subject now before the Court. Pp.?3?10.
(1)?The history of marriage as a union between two persons of the opposite sex marks the beginning of these cases. To the respondents, it would demean a timeless institution if marriage were extended to same-sex couples. But the petitioners, far from seeking to devalue marriage, seek it for themselves because of their respect?and need?for its privileges and responsibilities, as illustrated by the petitioners? own experiences. Pp.?3?6.
(2)?The history of marriage is one of both continuity and change. Changes, such as the decline of arranged marriages and the abandonment of the law of coverture, have worked deep transformations in the structure of marriage, affecting aspects of marriage once viewed as essential. These new insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution. Changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new generations.
This dynamic can be seen in the Nation?s experience with gay and lesbian rights. Well into the 20th century, many States condemned same-sex intimacy as immoral, and homosexuality was treated as an illness. Later in the century, cultural and political developments allowed same-sex couples to lead more open and public lives. Extensive public and private dialogue followed, along with shifts in public attitudes. Questions about the legal treatment of gays and lesbians soon reached the courts, where they could be discussed in the formal discourse of the law. In 2003, this Court overruled its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.?S. 186 , which upheld a Georgia law that criminalized certain homosexual acts, concluding laws making same-sex intimacy a crime ?demea[n] the lives of homosexual persons.? Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.?S. 558 . In 2012, the federal Defense of Marriage Act was also struck down. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.?S. ___. Numerous same-sex marriage cases reaching the federal courts and state supreme courts have added to the dialogue. Pp.?6?10.
(b)?The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex. Pp.?10?27.
(1)?The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs. See, e.g.,Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.?S. 438 ; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.?S. 479 ?486. Courts must exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect. History and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries. When new insight reveals discord between the Constitution?s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.
Applying these tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry is protected by the Constitution. For example, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.?S. 1 , invalidated bans on interracial unions, and Turner v. Safley, 482 U.?S. 78 , held that prisoners could not be denied the right to marry. To be sure, these cases presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners, as did Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.?S. 810 , a one-line summary decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal question. But other, more instructive precedents have expressed broader principles. See, e.g.,Lawrence, supra, at 574. In assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to same-sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why the right to marry has been long protected. See, e.g.,Eisenstadt, supra, at 453?454. This analysis compels the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to marry. Pp.?10?12.
(2)?Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples. The first premise of this Court?s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy. This abiding connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process Clause. See 388 U.?S., at 12. Decisions about marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can make. See Lawrence, supra, at 574. This is true for all persons, whatever their sexual orientation.
A second principle in this Court?s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. The intimate association protected by this right was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception, 381 U.?S., at 485, and was acknowledged in Turner, supra, at 95. Same-sex couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy intimate association, a right extending beyond mere freedom from laws making same-sex intimacy a criminal offense. See Lawrence,supra, at 567.
A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education. See, e.g.,Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.?S. 510 . Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser. They also suffer the significant material costs of being raised by unmarried parents, relegated to a more difficult and uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue thus harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples. See Windsor, supra, at ___. This does not mean that the right to marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have children. Precedent protects the right of a married couple not to procreate, so the right to marry cannot be conditioned on the capacity or commitment to procreate.
Finally, this Court?s cases and the Nation?s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation?s social order. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.?S. 190 . States have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social order. There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation?s society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest. Pp.?12?18.
(3)?The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment?s guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. This dynamic is reflected in Loving, where the Court invoked both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause; and in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.?S. 374 , where the Court invalidated a law barring fathers delinquent on child-support payments from marrying. Indeed, recognizing that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged, this Court has invoked equal protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on marriage, see, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.?S. 455 ?461, and confirmed the relation between liberty and equality, see, e.g., M.?L.?B. v. S.?L.?J., 519 U.?S. 102 ?121.
The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these constitutional safeguards in the context of the legal treatment of gays and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 U.?S., at 575. This dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. The challenged laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and they abridge central precepts of equality. The marriage laws at issue are in essence unequal: Same-sex couples are denied benefits afforded opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and continuing harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and lesbians. Pp.?18?22.
(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. Baker v. Nelson is overruled. The State laws challenged by the petitioners in these cases are held invalid to the extent they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. Pp.?22?23.
(5)?There may be an initial inclination to await further legislation, litigation, and debate, but referenda, legislative debates, and grassroots campaigns; studies and other writings; and extensive litigation in state and federal courts have led to an enhanced understanding of the issue. While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. Bowers, in effect, upheld state action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental right. Though it was eventually repudiated, men and women suffered pain and humiliation in the interim, and the effects of these injuries no doubt lingered long after Bowers was overruled. A ruling against same-sex couples would have the same effect and would be unjustified under the Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioners? stories show the urgency of the issue they present to the Court, which has a duty to address these claims and answer these questions. Respondents? argument that allowing same-sex couples to wed will harm marriage as an institution rests on a counterintuitive view of opposite-sex couples? decisions about marriage and parenthood. Finally, the First Amendment ensures that religions, those who adhere to religious doctrines, and others have protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths. Pp.?23?27.
(c)?The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of State. Since same-sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character. Pp.?27?28.
772 F.?3d 388, reversed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Roberts, C.?J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined.