NOTE:?Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.?S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP. et?al. v. PROMEGA CORP.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the federal circuit
No. 14?1538.?Argued December 6, 2016?Decided February 22, 2017
Respondent Promega Corporation sublicensed the Tautz patent, which claims a toolkit for genetic testing, to petitioner Life Technologies Corporation and its subsidiaries (collectively Life Technologies) for the manufacture and sale of the kits for use in certain licensed law enforcement fields worldwide. One of the kit?s five components, an enzyme known as the Taq polymerase, was manufactured by Life Technologies in the United States and then shipped to the United Kingdom, where the four other components were made, for combination there. When Life Technologies began selling the kits outside the licensed fields of use, Promega sued, claiming that patent infringement liability was triggered under ?271(f)(1) of the Patent Act, which prohibits the supply from the United States of ?all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention? for combination abroad. The jury returned a verdict for Promega, but the District Court granted Life Technologies? motion for judgment as a matter of law, holding that ?271(f)(1)?s phrase ?all or a substantial portion? did not encompass the supply of a single component of a multicomponent invention. The Federal Circuit reversed. It determined that a single important component could constitute a ?substantial portion? of the components of an invention under ?271(f)(1) and found the Taq polymerase to be such a component.
Held:?The supply of a single component of a multicomponent invention for manufacture abroad does not give rise to ?271(f)(1) liability. Pp.?4?11.
(a)?Section 271(f)(1)?s phrase ?substantial portion? refers to a quantitative measurement. Although the Patent Act itself does not define the term ?substantial,? and the term?s ordinary meaning may refer either to qualitative importance or to quantitatively large size, the statutory context points to a quantitative meaning. Neighboring words ?all? and ?portion? convey a quantitative meaning, and nothing in the neighboring text points to a qualitative interpretation. More-over, a qualitative reading would render the modifying phrase ?of the components? unnecessary the first time it is used in ?271(f)(1). Only the quantitative approach thus gives meaning to each statutory provision.
Promega?s proffered ?case-specific approach,? which would require a factfinder to decipher whether the components at issue are a ?substantial portion? under either a qualitative or a quantitative test, is rejected. Tasking juries with interpreting the statute?s meaning on an ad?hoc basis would only compound, not resolve, the statute?s ambiguity. And Promega?s proposal to adopt an analytical framework that accounts for both the components? quantitative and qualitative aspects is likely to complicate rather than aid the factfinder?s review. Pp.?4?8.
(b) Under a quantitative approach, a single component cannot constitute a ?substantial portion? triggering ?271(f)(1) liability. This conclusion is reinforced by ?271(f)?s text, context, and structure. Section 271(f)(1) consistently refers to the plural ?components,? indicating that multiple components make up the substantial portion. Reading ?271(f)(1) to cover any single component would also leave little room for ?271(f)(2), which refers to ?any component,? and would undermine ?271(f)(2)?s express reference to a single component ?especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention.? The better reading allows the two provisions to work in tandem and gives each provision its unique application. Pp.?8?10.
(c) The history of ?271(f) further bolsters this conclusion. Congress enacted ?271(f) in response to Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.?S. 518 , to fill a gap in the enforceability of patent rights by reaching components that are manufactured in the United States but assembled overseas. Consistent with Congress?s intent, a supplier may be liable under ?271(f)(1) for supplying from the United States all or a substantial portion of the components of the invention or under ?271(f)(2) for supplying a single component if it is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not a staple article or commodity. But, as here, when a product is made abroad and all components but a single commodity article are supplied from abroad, the activity is outside the statute?s scope. Pp.?10?11.
773 F.?3d. 1338, reversed and remanded.
Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ., joined, and in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined as to all but Part II?C. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined. Roberts, C.?J., took no part in the decision of the case.