FCC v. LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, 468 U.S. 364 (1984)

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
No. 82-912.
Argued January 16, 1984 Decided July 2, 1984

The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 (Act) established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), a nonprofit corporation, to disburse federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations in support of station operations and educational programming. Section 399 of the Act forbids any noncommercial educational station that receives a grant from the CPB to “engage in editorializing.” Appellees (Pacifica Foundation, a nonprofit corporation that owns and operates several noncommercial educational broadcasting stations that receive grants from the CPB, the League of Women Voters of California, and an individual listener and viewer of public broadcasting) brought an action in Federal District Court challenging the constitutionality of § 399. The District Court granted summary judgment in appellees’ favor, holding that § 399 violates the First Amendment.

Held: Section 399’s ban on editorializing violates the First Amendment. Pp. 374-402.

(a) Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause, has power to regulate the use of the broadcast medium. In the exercise of this power, Congress may seek to assure that the public receives through this medium a balanced presentation of information and views on issues of public importance that otherwise might not be addressed if control of the medium were left entirely in the hands of the owners and operators of broadcasting stations. At the same time, since broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative activity, the First Amendment must inform and give shape to the manner in which Congress exercises its regulatory power. Thus, although the broadcasting industry operates under restrictions not imposed upon other media, the thrust of these restrictions has generally been to secure the public’s First Amendment interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views on diverse matters of public concern. As a result, the absolute freedom to advocate one’s own positions without also presenting opposing viewpoints — a freedom enjoyed, for example, by newspaper publishers — is denied to broadcasters. Such restrictions have been upheld

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by this Court only when they were narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest, such as ensuring adequate and balanced coverage of public issues. Pp. 374-381.
(b) The restriction imposed by § 399 is specifically directed at a form of speech — the expression of editorial opinions — the lies at the heart of First Amendment protection, and is defined solely on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech. Section 399 singles out noncommercial broadcasters and denies them the right to address their chosen audience on matters of public importance. Pp. 381-384.
(c) Section 399’s broad ban on all editorializing by every station that receives CPB funds far exceeds what is necessary to protect against the risk of governmental interference or to prevent the public from assuming that editorials by public broadcasting stations represent the official view of government. The ban impermissibly sweeps within it a wide range of speech by wholly private stations on topics that do not take a directly partisan stand or that have nothing whatever to do with federal, state, or local government. Pp. 386-395.
(d) The patent overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of § 399’s ban also undermines the likelihood of a genuine governmental interest in preventing private groups from propagating their own views via public broadcasting. Section 399 does not prevent the use of noncommercial stations for the presentation of partisan views on controversial matters; instead, it merely bars a station from specifically labeling such issues as its own or those of its management. Pp. 396-399.
(e) Section 399 cannot be justified on the basis of Congress’ spending power as simply determining that Congress will not subsidize public broadcasting station editorials. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, distinguished. Since a noncommercial educational station that receives only 1% of its income from CPB grants is barred absolutely from editorializing, such a station has no way of limiting the use of its federal funds to noneditorial activities, and, more importantly, it is barred from using even private funds to finance its editorial activity. Pp. 399-401.

547 F. Supp. 379, affirmed.

BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL; and O’CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting statement, post, p. 402. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE J., joined, post, p. 402. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 408.

Samuel A. Alito, Jr., argued the cause for appellant. With him on the briefs were Solicitor General Lee, Assistant

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Attorney General McGrath, Acting Assistant Attorney General Willard, Deputy Solicitor General Bator, Anthony J. Steinmeyer, and Michael Jay Singer.

Frederic D. Woocher argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were Bill Lann Lee and John R. Phillips.[*]

JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Moved to action by a widely felt need to sponsor independent sources of broadcast programming as an alternative to commercial broadcasting, Congress set out in 1967 to support and promote the development of noncommercial, educational broadcasting stations. A keystone of Congress’ program was the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub.L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 47 U.S.C. § 390 et seq., which established the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, a nonprofit corporation authorized to disburse federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations in support of station operations and educational programming. Section 399 of that Act, as amended by the Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, Pub.L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 730, forbids any “noncommercial educational broadcasting station which receives a grant from the Corporation” to “engage in editorializing.”47 U.S.C. § 399. In this case, we are called upon to decide whether Congress, by imposing that restriction, has passed a “law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” in violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution.

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I A
The history of noncommercial, educational broadcasting in the United States is as old as broadcasting itself.[1] In its first efforts to regulate broadcasting, Congress made no special provision for noncommercial, educational broadcasting stations. Under the Radio Act of 1927 and the Communications Act of 1934, such stations were subject to the same licensing requirements as their commercial counterparts. As commercial broadcasting rapidly expanded during the 1930’s, however, the percentage of broadcast licenses held by noncommercial stations began to shrink. In 1939, recognizing the potential effect of these commercial pressures on educational stations, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) decided to reserve certain frequencies for educational radio, 47 C.F.R. § 4.131 — 47 C.F.R. § 4.133 (1939), and in 1945, the Commission allocated 20 frequencies on the new FM spectrum exclusively for educational use, FCC, Report of Proposed Allocations 77 (1945). Similarly, in 1952, with the advent of television, the FCC reserved certain television channels solely for educational stations. Television Assignments, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952). Helped in part by these allocations, a wide variety of noncommercial stations, some funded by state and local governments and others by private donations and foundation grants, developed during this period.[2]

It was not until 1962, however, that Congress provided any direct financial assistance to noncommercial, educational broadcasting. This first step was taken with the passage of

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the Educational Television Act of 1962, Pub.L. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64, which authorized the former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to distribute $32 million in matching grants over a 5-year period for the construction of noncommercial television facilities.

Impetus for expanded federal involvement came in 1967 when the Carnegie Corporation sponsored a special commission to review the state of educational broadcasting. Finding that the prospects for an expanded public broadcasting system rested on “the vigor of its local stations,” but that these stations were hobbled by chronic under financing, the Carnegie Commission called upon the Federal Government to supplement existing state, local, and private financing so that educational broadcasting could realize its full potential as a true alternative to commercial broadcasting. Carnegie I, at 33-34, 36-37.[3] In fashioning a legislative proposal to carry out this vision, the Commission recommended the creation of a nonprofit, nongovernmental “Corporation for Public Television” to provide support for noncommercial broadcasting, including funding for new program production, local station operations, and the establishment of satellite interconnection facilities to permit nationwide distribution of educational programs to all local stations that wished to receive and use them. Id., at 37-38.

The Commission’s report met with widespread approval, and its proposals became the blueprint for the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, which established the basic framework of the public broadcasting system of today. Titles I and III of

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the Act authorized over $38 million for continued HEW construction grants and for the study of instructional television. Title II created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB or Corporation), a nonprofit, private corporation governed by a 15-person, bipartisan Board of Directors appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.[4] The Corporation was given power to fund “the production of . . . educational television or radio programs for national or regional distribution,” 47 U.S.C. § 396(g) (2)(B) (1976 ed.), to make grants to local broadcasting stations that would “aid in financing local education . . . programming costs of such stations,” § 396(g)(2)(C), and to assist in the establishment and development of national interconnection facilities. § 396(g)(2)(E).[5] Aside from conferring these powers on the Corporation, Congress also adopted other measures designed both to ensure the autonomy of the Corporation and to protect the local stations from governmental interference and control. For example, all federal agencies, officers, and employees were prohibited from “exercis[ing] any direction, supervision or control” over the Corporation or local stations, § 398, and the Corporation itself was forbidden to “own or operate any television or radio broadcast station,” § 396(g)(3), and was further required to “carry out its purposes and functions . . . in ways that will most effectively assure the maximum freedom . . . from

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inference with or control of program content” of the local stations. § 396(g)(1)(D).

B
Appellee Pacifica Foundation is a nonprofit corporation that owns and operates several noncommercial educational broadcasting stations in five major metropolitan areas.[6] Its licensees have received and are presently receiving grants from the Corporation and are therefore prohibited from editorializing by the terms of § 399, as originally enacted and as recently amendment.[7] In April 1979, appellees brought this suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California challenging the constitutionality of former § 399. In October 1979, the Department of Justice informed

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both Houses and Congress and the District Court that it had decided not to defend the constitutionality of the statute.[8]
The Senate then adopted a resolution directing its counsel to intervene as amicus curiae in support of § 399. Counsel appeared and subsequently obtained dismissal of the lawsuit for want of a justiciable controversy because the Government had decided not to enforce the statute. While appellees’ appeal from this disposition was pending before the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, the Department of Justice under a new administration announced that it would defend the statute. The Court of Appeals then remanded the case to the District Court; the District Court permitted the Senate counsel to withdraw from the litigation, and, finding that a concrete controversy was now presented, vacated its earlier order of dismissal. While the suit was pending before the District Court, Congress, as already mentioned, see n. 7, supra, amended § 399 by confining the ban on editorializing to noncommercial stations that receive Corporation grants and by separately prohibiting all noncommercial stations from making political endorsements, irrespective of whether they receive federal funds. Subsequently, appellees amended their complaint to reflect this change, challenging only the ban on editorializing.[9]

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The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees, holding that § 399’s ban on editorializing violated the First Amendment. 547 F. Supp. 379 (1982). The court rejected the Federal Communication Commission’s contention that “§ 399 serves a compelling government interest in ensuring that funded noncommercial broadcasters do not become propaganda organs for the government.” Id., at 384-385. Noting the diverse sources of funding for noncommercial stations, the protections built into the Public Broadcasting Act to ensure that noncommercial broadcasters remain free of governmental influence, and the requirements of the FCC’s fairness doctrine which are designed to guard against one-sided presentation of controversial issues, the District Court concluded that the asserted fear of Government control was not sufficiently compelling to warrant § 399’s restriction on speech. Id., at 386. The court also rejected the contention that the restriction on editorializing as necessary to ensure that Government funding of non-commercial broadcast stations does not interfere with the balanced presentation of opinion on those stations. Id., at 387. The FCC appealed from the District Court judgment

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directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252. We postponed consideration of the question of our jurisdiction to the merits, 460 U.S. 1010 (1983),[10] and we now affirm.

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II
We begin by considering the appropriate standard of review. The District Court acknowledged that our decisions

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have generally applied a different First Amendment standard for broadcast regulation than in other areas, but after finding that no special characteristic of the broadcast media justified application of a less stringent standard in this case, it held that § 399 could survive constitutional scrutiny only if it served a “compelling” governmental interest. 547 F. Supp., at 384. Claiming that the court drew the wrong lessons from our prior decisions concerning broadcast regulation, the Government contends that a less demanding standard is required. It argues that Congress may, consistently with the First Amendment, exercise broad power to regulate broadcast speech because the medium of broadcasting is subject to the “special characteristic” of spectrum scarcity — a characteristic not shared by other media — which calls for more exacting regulation. This power, in the Government’s view, includes authority to restrict the ability of all broadcasters, both commercial and noncommercial, to editorialize. Brief for Appellant 31. Moreover, given the unique role of noncommercial broadcasting as a source of “programming excellence and diversity that the commercial sector could not or would not produce,” id., at 33, Congress was entitled to impose special restrictions such as § 399 upon these stations. The Government concludes by urging that § 399 is an appropriate and essential means of furthering “important” governmental interests, id., at 34, 35, 39, which leaves open the possibility that a wide variety of views on matters of public importance can be expressed through the medium of noncommercial educational broadcasting.

At first glance, of course, it would appear that the District Court applied the correct standard. Section 399 plainly operates to restrict the expression of editorial opinion on matters of public importance, and, as we have repeatedly explained, communication of this kind is entitled to the most

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exacting degree of First Amendment protection. E. g., Minneapolis Star Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776-777 (1978) Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1940). Were a similar ban on editorializing applied to newspapers and magazines, we would not hesitate to strike it down as violative of the First Amendment. E. g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). But, as the Government correctly notes, because broadcast regulation involves unique considerations, our cases have not followed precisely the same approach that we have applied to other media and have never gone so far as to demand that such regulations serve “compelling” government interests. At the same time, we think the Government’s argument loses sight of concerns that are important in this area and thus misapprehends the essential meaning of our prior decisions concerning the reach of Congress’ authority to regulate broadcast communication.

The fundamental principles that guide our evaluation of broadcast regulation are by now well established. First, we have long recognized that Congress, acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause, has power to regulate the use of this scarce and valuable national resource. The distinctive feature of Congress’ efforts in this area has been to ensure through the regulatory oversight of the FCC that only those who satisfy the “public interest, convenience, and necessity” are granted a license to use radio and television broadcast frequencies. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a).[11]

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Second, Congress may, in the exercise of this power, seek to assure that the public receives through this medium a balanced presentation of information on issues of public importance that otherwise might not be addressed if control of the medium were left entirely in the hands of those who own and operate broadcasting stations. Although such governmental regulation has never been allowed with respect to the print media, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974), we have recognized that “differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.” Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). The fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the new medium of broadcasting that, in our view, has required some adjustment in First Amendment analysis is that “[b]roadcast frequencies are a scarce resource [that] must be portioned out among applicants.”Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973). Thus, our cases have taught that, given spectrum scarcity, those who are granted a license to broadcast must serve in a sense as fiduciaries for the public by presenting “those views and voices which are representative of [their] community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.”Red Lion, supra, at 389. As we observed in that case, because “[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, . . . the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences [through the medium of broadcasting]

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is crucial here [and it] may not constitutionally be abridged either by Congress or by the FCC.” 395 U.S., at 390.

Finally, although the Government’s interest in ensuring balanced coverage of public issues is plainly both important and substantial, we have, at the same time, made clear that broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative activity. As a result, the First Amendment must uniform and give shape to the manner in which Congress exercises its regulatory power in this area. Unlike common carriers, broadcasters are “entitled under the First Amendment to exercise `the widest journalistic freedom consistent with their public [duties].'” CBS, Ins. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, at 110). See also FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 703
(1979). Indeed, if the public’s interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views is to be fully served, we must necessarily rely in large part upon the editorial initiative and judgment of the broadcasters who bear the public trust. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v Democratic National Committee, supra, at 124-127.

Our prior cases illustrate these principles. In Red Lion, for example, we upheld the FCC’s “fairness doctrine” — which requires broadcasters to provide adequate coverage of public issues and to ensure that this coverage fairly and accurately reflects the opposing views — because the doctrine advanced the substantial governmental interest in ensuring balanced presentations of views in this limited medium and yet posed no threat that a “broadcaster [would be denied permission] to carry a particular program or to publish his own views.”395 U.S., at 396.[12] Similarly, in CBS, Ins. v. FCC, supra, the

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Court upheld the right of access for federal candidates imposed by § 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act both because that provision “makes a significant contribution of freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for the effective operation of the democratic process,” id., at 396, and because it defined a sufficiently “limited right of `reasonable’ access” so that “the discretion of broadcasters to present their views on any issue or to carry any particular type of programming” was not impaired. Id., at 396-397 (emphasis in original). Finally, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, supra, the Court affirmed the FCC’s refusal to require broadcast licensees to accept all paid political advertisements. Although it was argued that such a requirement would serve the public’s First Amendment interest in receiving additional views on public issues, the Court rejected this approach, finding that such a requirement would tend to transform broadcasters into common carriers and would intrude unnecessarily upon the editorial discretion of broadcasters. Id., at 123-125. The FCC’s ruling, therefore, helped to advance the important purposes of the Communications Act, grounded in the First Amendment, of preserving the right of broadcasters to exercise “the widest journalistic freedom consistent with [their] public obligations,” and of guarding against “the risk of an enlargement

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of Government control over the content of broadcast discussion of public issues.” Id., at 110, 126.[13]

Thus, although the broadcasting industry plainly operates under restraints not imposed upon other media, the thrust of these restrictions has generally been to secure the public’s First Amendment interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views on diverse matters of public concern. As a result of these restrictions, of course, the absolute freedom to advocate one’s own positions without also presenting opposing viewpoints — a freedom enjoyed, for example, by newspaper publishers and soapbox orators — is denied to broadcasters. But, as our cases attest, these restrictions have been upheld only when we were satisfied that the restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest, such as ensuring adequate and balanced coverage of public issues, e. g., Red Lion, 395 U.S., at 377. See also CBS, Inc. v. FCC, supra, at 396-397; Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S., at 110-111; Red Lion, supra, at 396. Making that

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judgment requires a critical examination of the interests of the public and broadcasters in light of the particular circumstances of each case. E. g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

III
We turn now to consider whether the restraint imposed by § 399 satisfies the requirements established by our prior cases for permissible broadcast regulation. Before assessing the Government’s proffered justifications for the statute, however, two central features of the ban against editorializing must be examined, since they help to illuminate the importance of the First amendment interests at stake in this case.

A
First, the restriction imposed by § 399 is specifically directed at a form of speech — namely, the expression of editorial opinion — that lies at the heart of First Amendment protection. In construing the reach of the statute, the FCC has explained that “although the use of noncommercial educational broadcast facilities by licensees, their management or those speaking on their behalf for the propagation of the licensee’s own views on public issues is therefore not to be permitted, such prohibition should not be construed to inhibit any other presentations on controversial issues of public importance.”Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d 297, 302 (1973) (emphasis added). The Commission’s interpretation of § 399 simply highlights the fact that what the statute forecloses is the expression of editorial opinion on “controversial issues of public importance.” As we recently reiterated in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982), “expression on public issues `has always rested on the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.'” Id., at 913 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). And we have emphasized:

“The freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to

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discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment. . . . Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.” Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S., at 101-102.

The editorial has traditionally played precisely this role by informing and arousing the public, and by criticizing and cajoling those who hold government office in order to help launch new solutions to the problems of the time. Preserving the free expression of editorial opinion, therefore, is part and parcel of “a profound national commitment . . . that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270
(1964). As we recognized in Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214
(1966), the special place of the editorial in our First Amendment jurisprudence simply reflects the fact that the press, of which the broadcasting industry is indisputably a part, United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), carries out a historic, dual responsibility in our society of reporting information and of bringing critical judgment to bear on public affairs. Indeed, the pivotal importance of editorializing as a means of satisfying the public’s interest in receiving a wide variety of ideas and views through the medium of broadcasting has long been recognized by the FCC; the Commission has for the past 35 years actively encouraged commercial broadcast licensees to include editorials on public affairs in their programming.[14]

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Because § 399 appears to restrict precisely that form of speech which the Framers of the Bill of Rights were most anxious to protect — speech that is “indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth” — we must be especially careful in weighing the interests that are asserted in support of this restriction and in assessing the precision with which the ban is crafted. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

Second, the scope of § 399’s ban is defined solely on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech. A wide variety of noneditorial speech “by licensees, their management or those speaking on their behalf,” Accuracy in Media, Inc., 45 F.C.C.2d, at 302, is plainly not prohibited by § 399. Examples of such permissible forms of speech include daily announcements of the station’s program schedule or over-the-air appeals for contributions from listeners. Consequently, in order to determine whether a particular statement by station management constitutes an “editorial” proscribed by § 399, enforcement authorities must necessarily examine the content of the message that is conveyed to determine whether the views expressed concern “controversial issues of public importance.” Ibid.

As JUSTICE STEVENS observed in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1980), however: “A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing

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more than a desire to curtail expression of a particular point of view on controversial issues of general interest is the purest example of a `law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’ A regulation that denies one group of persons the right to address a selected audience on `controversial issues of public policy’ is plainly such a regulation.” Id., at 546 (opinion concurring in judgment); accord, id., at 537-540 (majority opinion). Section 399 is just such a regulation, for it singles out noncommercial broadcasters and denies them the right to address their chosen audience on matters of public importance. Thus, in enacting § 399 Congress appears to have sought, in much the same may that the New York Public Service Commission had attempted through the regulation of utility company bill inserts struck down in Consolidated Edison, to limit discussion of controversial topics and thus to shape the agenda for public debate. Since, as we observed in Consolidated Edison, “[t]he First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic,” id., at 537, we must be particularly wary in assessing § 399 to determine whether it reflects an impermissible attempt “to allow a government [to] control . . . the search for political truth.” Id., at 538.[15]

B
In seeking to defend the prohibition on editorializing imposed by § 399, the Government urges that the statute was aimed at preventing two principal threats to the overall success of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967. According to this argument, the ban was necessary, first, to protect noncommercial educational broadcasting stations from being coerced, as a result of federal financing, into becoming vehicles

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for Government propagandizing or the objects of governmental influence; and, second, to keep these stations from becoming convenient targets for capture by private interest groups wishing to express their own partisan viewpoints.[16]
By seeking to safeguard the public’s right to a balanced presentation of public issues through the prevention of either governmental or private bias, these objectives are, of course, broadly consistent with the goals identified in our earlier broadcast regulation cases. But, in sharp contrast to the restrictions upheld in Red Lion or in CBS, Inc. v. FCC, which left room for editorial discretion and simply required broadcast editors to grant others access to the microphone, § 399 directly prohibits the broadcaster from speaking out on public issues even in a balanced and fair manner. The Government insists, however, that the hazards posed in the “special” circumstances of noncommercial

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educational broadcasting are so great that § 399 is an indispensable means of preserving the public’s First Amendment interests. We disagree.

(1)

When Congress first decided to provide financial support for the expansion and development of noncommercial educational stations, all concerned agreed that this step posed some risk that these traditionally independent stations might be pressured into becoming forums devoted solely to programming and views that were acceptable to the Federal Government. That Congress was alert to these dangers cannot be doubted. It sought through the Public Broadcasting Act to fashion a system that would provide local stations with sufficient funds to foster their growth and development while preserving their tradition of autonomy and community-orientation.[17]
A cardinal objective of the Act was the establishment

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of a private corporation that would “facilitate the development of educational radio and television broadcasting and . . . afford maximum protection to such broadcasting from extraneous interference and control.” 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (6) (1976 ed.).

The intended role of § 399 in achieving these purposes, however, is not as clear. The provision finds no antecedent in the Carnegie report, which generally provided the model for most other aspects of the Act. It was not part of the administration’s original legislative proposal. And it was not included in the original version of the Act passed by the Senate. The provision found its way into the Act only as a result of an amendment in the House. Indeed, it appears that, as the House Committee Report frankly admits, § 399 was added not because Congress thought it was essential to preserving the autonomy and vitality of local stations, but rather “[o]ut of an abundance of caution.” H.R. Rep. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 20 (1967).[18]

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More importantly, an examination of both the overall legislative scheme established by the 1967 Act and the character of public broadcasting demonstrates that the interest asserted by the Government is not substantially advanced by § 399. First, to the extent that federal financial support creates a risk that stations will lose their independence through the bewitching power of governmental largesse, the elaborate structure established by the Public Broadcasting Act

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already operates to insulate local stations from governmental interference. Congress not only mandated that the new Corporation for Public Broadcasting would have a private, bipartisan structure, see §§ 396(c)-(f), but also imposed a variety of important limitations on its powers. The Corporation was prohibited from owning or operating any station, § 396(g)(3), it was required to adhere strictly to a standard of “objectivity and balance” in disbursing federal funds to local stations, § 396(g)(1)(A), and it was prohibited from contributing to or otherwise supporting any candidate for office, § 396(f)(3).

The Act also established a second layer of protections which serve to protect the stations from governmental coercion and interference. Thus, in addition to requiring the Corporation to operate so as to “assure the maximum freedom [of local stations] from interference with or control of program content or other activities,” § 396(g)(1)(D), the Act expressly forbids “any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over educational television or radio broadcasting, or over the Corporation or any of its grantees or contractors . . .,” § 398(a) (1976 ed.). Subsequent amendments to the Act have confirmed Congress’ commitment to the principle that because local stations are the “bedrock of the system,” their independence from governmental interference and control must be fully guaranteed. These amendments have provided long-term appropriations authority for public broadcasting, rather than allowing funding to depend upon yearly appropriations, see § 396(k)(1)(C), as amended, Pub.L. 97-35, Title XII, § 1227, 95 Stat. 727; have strictly defined the percentage of appropriated funds that must be disbursed by the Corporation to local stations, § 396(k)(3)(A)-(B); and have defined objective criteria under which local television and radio stations receive basic grants from the Corporation to be used at the discretion of the station. §§ 396(k)(6)(A)-(B), 396(k)(7). The principal thrust of the amendments, therefore, has been to assure long-term

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appropriations for the Corporation and, more importantly, to insist that it pass specified portions of these funds directly through to local stations to give them greater autonomy in defining the uses to which those funds should be put. Thus, in sharp contrast to § 399, the unifying theme of these various statutory provisions is that they substantially reduce the risk of governmental interference with the editorial judgments of local stations without restricting those stations’ ability to speak on matters of public concern.[19]

Even if these statutory protections were thought insufficient to the task, however, suppressing the particular category of speech restricted by § 399 is simply not likely, given the character of the public broadcasting system, to reduce substantially the risk that the Federal Government will seek to influence or put pressure on local stations. An underlying supposition of the Government’s argument in this regard is that individual noncommercial stations are likely to speak so forcefully on particular issues that Congress, the ultimate source of the stations’ federal funding, will be tempted to retaliate against these individual stations by restricting appropriations for all of public broadcasting. But, as the District Court recognized, the character of public broadcasting

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suggests that such a risk is speculative at best. There are literally hundred of public radio and television stations in communities scattered throughout the United States and its territories, see CPB, 1983-84 Public Broadcasting Directory 20-50, 66-86 (Sept. 1983). Given that central fact, it seems reasonable to infer that the editorial voices of these stations will prove to be as distinctive, varied, and idiosyncratic as the various communities they represent. More importantly, the editorial focus of any particular station can fairly be expected to focus largely on issues affecting only its community.[20] Accordingly, absent some showing by the Government to the contrary, the risk that local editorializing will place all of public broadcasting in jeopardy is not sufficiently pressing to warrant § 399’s broad suppression of speech.

Indeed, what is far more likely than local station editorials to pose the kinds of dangers hypothesized by the Government are the wide variety of programs addressing controversial issues produced, often with substantial CPB funding, for national distribution to local stations. Such programs truly have the potential to reach a large audience and, because of the critical commentary they contain, to have the kind of genuine national impact that might trigger a congressional response or kindle governmental resentment. The ban imposed by § 399, however, is plainly not directed at the potentially controversial content of such programs; it is, instead, leveled solely at the expression of editorial opinion by local station management, a form of expression that is far more likely to be aimed at a smaller local audience, to have less

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national impact, and to be confined to local issues. In contrast, the Act imposes no substantive restrictions, other than normal requirements of balance and fairness, on those who produce nationally distributed programs. Indeed, the Act is designed in part to encourage and sponsor the production of such programs and to allow each station to decide for itself whether to accept such programs for local broadcast.[21]

Furthermore, the manifest imprecision of the ban imposed by § 399 reveals that its proscription is not sufficiently tailored to the harms it seeks to prevent to justify its substantial interference with broadcasters’ speech. Section

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399 includes within its grip a potentially infinite variety of speech, most of which would not be related in any way to governmental affairs, political candidacies, or elections. Indeed, the breadth of editorial commentary is as wide as human imagination permits. But the Government never explains how, say, an editorial by local station management urging improvements in a town’s parks or museums will so infuriate Congress or other federal officials that the future of public broadcasting will be imperiled unless such editorials are suppressed. Nor is it explained how the suppression of editorials alone serves to reduce the risk of governmental retaliation and interference when it is clear that station management is fully able to broadcast controversial views so long as such views are not labeled as its own. See infra, at 396, and n. 25.

The Government appears to recognize these flaws in § 399, because it focuses instead on the suggestion that the source of governmental influence may well be state and local governments, many of which have established public broadcasting commissions that own and operate local noncommercial educational stations.[22] The ban on editorializing is all the more necessary with respect to these stations, the argument runs, because the management of such stations will be especially likely to broadcast only editorials that are favorable to the state or local authorities that hold the purse strings. The Government’s argument, however, proves too much. First, § 399’s ban applies to the many private noncommercial community organizations that own and operate stations that

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are not controlled in any way by state or local government. Second, the legislative history of the Public Broadcasting Act clearly indicates that Congress was concerned with “assur[ing] complete freedom from any Federal Government influence.” The Public Television Act of 1967: Hearings on S. 1160 before the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Pastore) (emphasis added).[23] Consistently with this concern, Congress refused to create any federally owned stations and it expressly forbade the CPB to own or operate any television or radio stations, § 396(g)(3). By contrast, although Congress was clearly aware in 1967 that many noncommercial educational stations were owned by state and local governments, it did not hesitate to extend federal assistance to such stations, it imposed no special requirements to restrict state or local control over these stations, and, indeed, it ensured through the structure of the Act that these stations would be as insulated from federal interference as the wholly private stations.[24]

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Finally, although the Government certainly has a substantial interest in ensuring that the audiences of noncommercial stations will not be led to think that the broadcaster’s editorials reflect the official view of the Government, this interest can be fully satisfied by less restrictive means that are readily available. To address this important concern, Congress could simply require public broadcasting stations to broadcast a disclaimer every time they editorialize which would state that the editorial represents only the view of the station’s management and does not in any away represent the views of the Federal Government or any of the station’s other sources of funding. Such a disclaimer — similar to those often used in commercial and noncommercial programming of a controversial nature — would effectively and directly communicate to the audience that the editorial reflected only the views of the station rather than those of the Government. Furthermore, such disclaimers would have the virtue of clarifying the responses that might be made under the fairness doctrine by opponents of the station’s position, since those opponents would know with certainty that they were responding only to the station’s views and not in any sense to the Government’s position.

In sum, § 399’s broad ban on all editorializing by every station that receives CPB funds far exceeds what is necessary to protect against the risk of governmental interference or to prevent the public from assuming that editorials by public broadcasting stations represent the official view of government. The regulation impermissibly sweeps within its prohibition a wide range of speech by wholly private stations on topics that do not take a directly partisan stand or that have nothing whatever to do with federal, state, or local government.

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(2)

Assuming that the Government’s second asserted interest in preventing noncommercial stations from becoming a “privileged outlet for the political and ideological opinions of station owners and managers,” Brief for Appellant 34, is legitimate, the substantiality of this asserted interest is dubious. The patent overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of § 399’s ban “undermines the likelihood of a genuine [governmental] interest” in preventing private groups from propagating their own views via public broadcasting. First National Bank of Boston v, Bellotti, 435 U.S., at 793. If it is true, as the Government contends, that noncommercial stations remain free, despite § 399, to broadcast a wide variety of controversial views through their power to control program selection, to select which persons will be interviewed, and to determine how news reports will be presented, Brief for Appellant 41, then it seems doubtful that § 399 can fairly be said to advance any genuinely substantial governmental interest in keeping controversial or partisan opinions from being aired by noncommercial stations. Indeed, since the very same opinions that cannot be expressed by the station’s management may be aired so long as they are communicated by a commentator or by a guest appearing at the invitation of the station during an interview, ibid.; see also Accuracy in Media, 45 F.C.C.2d, at 302, § 399 clearly “provides only ineffective or remote support for the government’s purpose.”Central Hudson Gas Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). Cf. Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S., at 45; First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, supra, at 793.[25]

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In short, § 399 does not prevent the use of noncommercial stations for the presentation of partisan views on controversial matters; instead, it merely bars a station from specifically communicating such views on its own behalf or on behalf of its management. If the vigorous expression of controversial opinions is, as the Government assures us, affirmatively encouraged by the Act, and if local licensees are permitted under the Act to exercise editorial control over the selection of programs, controversial or otherwise, that are aired on their stations, then § 399 accomplishes only one thing — the suppression of editorial speech by station management. It does virtually nothing, however, to reduce the risk that public stations will serve solely as outlets for expression of narrow partisan views. What we said in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee
applies, therefore, with equal force here: the “sacrifice [of]First Amendment protections for so speculative a gain is not warranted . . . .” 412 U.S., at 127.

Finally, the public’s interest in preventing public broadcasting stations from becoming forums for lopsided presentations of narrow partisan positions is clearly secured by

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a variety of other regulatory means that intrude far less drastically upon the “journalistic freedom” of noncommercial broadcasters. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S., at 110. The requirements of the FCC’s fairness doctrine, for instance, which apply to commercial and noncommercial stations alike, ensure that such editorializing would maintain a reasonably balanced and fair presentation of controversial issues. Thus, even if the management of a noncommercial educational station were inclined to seek to further only its own partisan views when editorializing, it simply could not do so. Indeed, in considering the constitutionality of the FCC’s fairness doctrine, the Court in Red Lion considered precisely the same justification invoked by the Government today in support of § 399: that without some requirement of fairness and balance, “station owners . . . would have unfettered power . . . to communication only their own views on public issues . . . and to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed.”395 U.S., at 392. The solution to this problem offered by § 399, however, is precisely the opposite of the remedy prescribed by the FCC and endorsed by the Court in Red Lion. Rather than requiring noncommercial broadcasters who express editorial opinions on controversial subjects to permit more speech on such subjects to ensure that the public’s First Amendment interest in receiving a balanced account of the issue is met, § 399 simply silences all editorial speech by such broadcasters. Since the breadth of § 399 extends so far beyond what is necessary to accomplish the goals identified by the Government, it fails to satisfy the First Amendment standards that we have applied in this area.

We therefore hold that even if some of the hazards at which § 399 was aimed are sufficiently substantial, the restriction is not crafted with sufficient precision to remedy those dangers that may exist to justify the significant abridgment of speech worked by the provision’s broad ban on editorializing. The

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statute is not narrowly tailored to address any of the Government’s suggested goals. Moreover, the public’s “paramount right” to be fully and broadly informed on matters of public importance through the medium of noncommercial educational broadcasting is not well served by the restriction, for its effect is plainly to diminish rather than augment “the volume and quality of coverage” of controversial issues. Red Lion, 395 U.S., at 393. Nor do we see any reason to deny noncommercial broadcasters the right to address matters of public concern on the basis of merely speculative fears of adverse public or governmental reactions to such speech.

IV
Although the Government did not present the argument in any form to the District Court,[26] it now seeks belatedly to justify § 399 on the basis of Congress’ spending power. Relying upon our recent decision in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), the Government argues that by prohibiting noncommercial educational stations that receive CPB grants from editorializing, Congress has, in the proper exercise of its spending power, simply determined that it “will not subsidize public broadcasting station editorials.” Brief for Appellant 42. I Taxation With Representation, the Court found that Congress could, in the exercise of its spending power, reasonably refuse to subsidize the lobbying activities of tax-exempt charitable organizations by prohibiting such organizations from using tax-deductible contributions to support their lobbying efforts. In so holding, however, we explained that such organizations remained free “to receive [tax-]deductible

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contributions to support nonlobbying activit[ies].”461 U.S., at 545. Thus, a charitable organization could create, under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (3), an affiliated to conduct its nonlobbying activities using tax-deductible contributions, and, at the same time, establish, under § 501(c)(4), a separate affiliate to pursue its lobbying efforts without such contributions. 461 U.S., at 544; see also id., at 552-553 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring). Given that statutory alternative, the Court concluded that “Congress has not infringed any First Amendment rights or regulated any First Amendment activity; [it] has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s lobbying.” Id., at 546.

In this case, however, unlike the situation faced by the charitable organization in Taxation With Representation, a noncommercial educational station that receives only 1% of its overall income from CPB grants is barred absolutely from all editorializing. Therefore, in contrast to the appellee i Taxation With Representation, such a station is not able to segregate its activities according to the source of its funding. The station has no way of limiting the use of its federal funds to all noneditorializing activities, and, more importantly, it is barred from using even wholly private funds to finance its editorial activity.

Of course, if Congress were to adopt a revised version of § 399 that permitted noncommercial educational broadcasting stations to establish “affiliate” organizations which could then use the station’s facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds, such a statutory mechanism would plainly be valid under the reasoning of Taxation With Representation. Under such a statute, public broadcasting stations would be free, in the same way that the charitable organization i Taxation With Representation was free, to make known its views on matters of public importance through its nonfederally funded, editorializing affiliate without losing federal grants for its noneditorializing broadcast activities. Cf. id.,

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at 544. But in the absence of such authority, we must reject the Government’s contention that our decision in Taxation With Representation is controlling here.[27]

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V
In conclusion, we emphasize that our disposition of this case rests upon a narrow proposition. We do not hold that the Congress or the FCC is without power to regulate the content, timing, or character of speech by noncommercial educational broadcasting stations. Rather, we hold only that the specific interests sought to be advanced by § 399’s ban on editorializing are either not sufficiently substantial or are not served in a sufficiently limited manner to justify the substantial abridgment of important journalistic freedoms which the First Amendment jealously protects. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is

Affirmed.

JUSTICE WHITE: Believing that the editorializing and candidate endorsement proscription stand or fall together and being confident that Congress may condition use of its funds on abstaining from political endorsements, I join JUSTICE REHNQUIST’s dissenting opinion.

JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting.

All but three paragraphs of the Court’s lengthy opinion in this case are devoted to the development of a scenario in which the Government appears as the “Big Bad Wolf,” and appellee Pacifica as “Little Red Riding Hood.” In the Court’s scenario the Big Bad Wolf cruelly forbids Little Red

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Riding Hood to take to her grandmother some of the food that she is carrying in her basket. Only three paragraphs are used to delineate a truer picture of the litigants, wherein it appears that some of the food in the basket was given to Little Red Riding Hood by the Big Bad Wolf himself, and that the Big Bad Wolf had told Little Red Riding Hood in advance that if she accepted his food she would have to abide by his conditions. Congress in enacting § 399 of the Public Broadcasting Act, 47 U.S.C. § 399, has simply determined that public funds shall not be used to subsidize noncommercial, educational broadcasting stations which engage in “editorializing” or which support or oppose any political candidate. I do not believe that anything in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents Congress from choosing to spend public moneys in that manner. Perhaps a more appropriate analogy than that of Little Red Riding Hood and the Big Bad Wolf is that of Faust and Mephistopheles; Pacifica, well aware of § 399’s condition on its receipt of public money, nonetheless accepted the public money and now seeks to avoid the conditions which Congress legitimately has attached to receipt of that funding.

While noncommercial, educational broadcasting has a long history in this country, its success was spotty at best until the Federal Government came to its assistance some 45 years ago. Beginning in the late 1930’s, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reserved certain frequencies, first for educational radio, 47 CAR §§ 4.131 (1939), and then for educational television, Television Assignments, 41 F.C.C. 148 (1952). But even with that assistance, by 1962 there were only 50 educational television stations on the air, and two-thirds of the population had no access to educational television. S. Rep. No. 67, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1961). In that year Congress passed the Educational Television Act of 1962, Pub.L. 87-447, 76 Stat. 64, which appropriated $32 million over a period of five years to aid the construction of educational stations, and by 1967, 126 such stations were operating.

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Congress’ vision was that public broadcasting would be a forum for the educational, cultural, and public affairs broadcasting which commercial stations had been unable or unwilling to furnish. In order to further that vision, in 1967 Congress passed the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, Pub.L. 90-129, 81 Stat. 365, 47 U.S.C. § 390 et seq., of which § 399 is a part, which created the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), a nonprofit, Government-chartered corporation governed by a Board of Directors appointed by the President. Although Congress could have chosen to create a federally owned broadcasting network, instead it chose a Government funding program whereby CPB would make grants to stations owned by others, fund the production of programs, and assist in the establishment and development of interconnection systems.

Congress’ intent was that CPB’s subsidies would ensure that “programs of high quality, diversity, creativity, excellence, and innovation, which are obtained from diverse sources, will be made available to public telecommunications entities, with strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature.”47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A). Understandably Congress did not leave its creature CPB free to roam at large in the broadcasting world, but instead imposed certain restrictions, in keeping with Congress’ purposes in passing the Act, on CPB’s authorization to grant funds. For example, Congress required that stations receiving CPB grants be government entities or nonprofit organizations, 47 U.S.C. § 397(6), (7), and it prohibited them from selling air time for any purpose whatever — including selling air time for political or public affairs presentations. §§ 397(7), 399a; see 47 C.F.R. § 73.503(d), 73.621(e) (1983). Furthermore, in order to prevent recipient stations from serving as outlets for the political and ideological views of station owners and managers, Congress also insisted in § 399 that subsidized educational stations not engage in editorializing or endorsing or opposing political candidates.

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The Court’s three-paragraph discussion of why § 399, repeatedly reexamined and retained by Congress, violates the First Amendment is to me utterly unpersuasive. Congress has rationally determined that the bulk of the taxpayers whose moneys provide the funds for grants by the CPB would prefer not to see the management of local educational stations promulgate its own private views on the air at taxpayer expense. Accordingly Congress simply has decided not to subsidize stations which engage in that activity.

Last Term, in Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983), we upheld a provision of the Internal Revenue Code which deprives an otherwise eligible organization of its tax-exempt status and its right to receive tax-deductible contributions if it engages in lobbying. We squarely rejected the contention that Congress’ decision not to subsidize lobbying violates the First Amendment, even though we recognized that the right to lobby is constitutionally protected. In so holding we reiterated that “a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.” Id., at 549. We also rejected the nation that, because Congress chooses to subsidize some speech but not other speech, its exercise of its spending powers is subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Id., at 547-548.

Relying primarily on the reasoning of the concurrence rather than of the majority opinion in Taxation with Representation, the Court today seeks to avoid the thrust of that opinion by pointing out that a public broadcasting station is barred from editorializing with its nonfederal funds even though it may receive only a minor fraction of its income from CPB grants. The Court reasons that § 399 does not operate simply to restrict the use of federal funds to purposes defined by Congress; instead, it goes further by prohibiting any station that receives “only 1% of its overall income from CPB grants” from using “even wholly private funds to finance its editorial activity.” Ante, at 400.

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But to me there is no distinction between § 399 and the statute which we upheld in Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U.S. 127
(1947). Section 12(a) of the Hatch Act totally prohibits any local or state employee who is employed in any activity which receives partial or total financing from the United States from taking part in any political activities. One might just as readily denounce such congressional action as prohibiting employees of a state or local government receiving even a minor fraction of that government’s income from federal assistance from exercising their First Amendment right to speak. But not surprisingly this Court upheld the Hatch Act provision in Oklahoma v. CSC, supra, succinctly stating:

“While the United States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local political activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed.” Id., at 143.[*]

See also CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (rejecting a First Amendment attack on the Hatch Act provisions applicable to federal employees).

The Court seems to believe that Congress actually subsidizes editorializing only if a station uses federal money specifically to cover the expenses that the Court believes can be isolated as editorializing expenses. But to me the Court’s approach ignores economic reality. CPB’s unrestricted grants are used for salaries, training, equipment, promotion, etc. — financial expenditures which benefit all aspects of a station’s programming, including management’s editorials.

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Given the impossibility of compartmentalizing programming expenses in any meaningful way, it seems clear to me that the only effective means for preventing the use of public moneys to subsidize the airing of management’s views is for Congress to ban a subsidized station from all on-the-air editorializing. Under the Court’s view, if Congress decided to withhold a 100% subsidy from a station which editorializes, that decision would be constitutional under the principle affirmed in our Taxation With Representation decision. Surely on these facts, the distinction between the Government’s power to withhold a 100% subsidy, on the one hand, and the 20-30% subsidy involved here, 547 F. Supp. 379, 385
(CD Cal. 1982), on the other hand, is simply trivialization.

This is not to say that the Government may attach any
condition to its largess; it is only to say that when the Government is simply exercising its power to allocate its own public funds, we need only find that the condition imposed has a rational relationship to Congress’ purpose in providing the subsidy and that it is not primarily “`”aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.”‘” Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959), quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958), in turn quoting American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950). In this case Congress’ prohibition is directly related to its purpose in providing subsidies for public broadcasting, and it is plainly rational for Congress to have determined that taxpayer moneys should not be used to subsidize management’s views or to pay for management’s exercise of partisan politics. Indeed, it is entirely rational for Congress to have wished to avoid the appearance of Government sponsorship of a particular view or a particular political candidate. Furthermore, Congress’ prohibition is strictly neutral. In no sense can it be said that Congress has prohibited only editorial views of one particular ideological bent. Nor has it prevented public stations from airing programs, documentaries, interviews, etc. dealing with controversial subjects, so long as management

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itself does not expressly endorse a particular viewpoint. And Congress has not prevented station management from communicating its own views on those subjects through any medium other than subsidized public broadcasting.

For the foregoing reasons I find this case entirely different from the so-called “unconstitutional condition” cases, wherein the Court has stated that the government “may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests — especially his interest in freedom of speech.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). In those cases the suppressed speech was not content-neutral in the same sense as here, and in those cases, there is at best only a strained argument that the legislative purpose of the condition imposed was to avoid subsidizing the prohibited speech. Speiser v. Randall, supra, is illustrative of the difference. In that case California’s decision to deny its property tax exemption to veterans who would not declare that they would not work to overthrow the government was plainly directed at suppressing what California regarded as speech of a dangerous content. And the condition imposed was so unrelated to the benefit to be conferred that it is difficult to argue that California’s property tax exemption actually subsidized the dangerous speech.

Here, in my view, Congress has rationally concluded that the bulk of taxpayers whose moneys provide the funds for grants by the CPB would prefer not to see the management of public stations engage in editorializing or the endorsing or opposing of political candidates. Because Congress’ decision to enact § 399 is a rational exercise of its spending powers and strictly neutral, I would hold that nothing in the First Amendment makes it unconstitutional. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court.

JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting.

The court jester who mocks the King must choose his words with great care. An artist is likely to paint a flattering portrait of his patron. The child who wants a new toy

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does not preface his request with a comment on how fat his mother is. Newspaper publishers have been known to listen to their advertising managers. Elected officials may remember how their elections were financed. By enacting the statutory provision that the Court invalidates today, a sophisticated group of legislators expressed a concern about the potential impact of Government funds on pervasive and powerful organs of mass communication. One need not have heard the raucous voice of Adolf Hitler over Radio Berlin to appreciate the importance of that concern.

As JUSTICE WHITE correctly notes, the statutory prohibitions against editorializing and candidate endorsements rest on the same foundation. In my opinion that foundation is far stronger than merely “a rational basis” and it is not weakened by the fact that it is buttressed by other provisions that are also designed to avoid the insidious evils of government propaganda favoring particular points of view. The quality of the interest in maintaining government neutrality in the free market of ideas — of avoiding subtle forms of censorship and propaganda — outweigh the impact on expression that results from this statute. Indeed, by simply terminating or reducing funding, Congress could curtail much more expression with no risk whatever of a constitutional transgression.

In order to explain my assessment of the case, it is necessary first to supplement the majority’s description of the impact of the statute on free expression and then to comment on the justification for that impact.

I
The relevant facts may be briefly stated. Appellee League of Women Voters of California, a nonprofit organization, wants to enlist the “editorial support” of educational broadcasters in support of its causes. App. 8. Appellee Henry Waxman, a regular listener and viewer of educational stations, desires to hear the “editorial opinions” of educational

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stations. Id., at 9. Appellee Pacifica, a nonprofit educational corporation which operates five educational radio stations — the broadcasts from which reach 20 percent of the Nation’s population — wants to “broadcast its views on various important public issues, and . . . clearly label those views as being editorials broadcast on behalf of the Pacifica management.” Id., at 9-10.

In short, Pacifica wants to broadcast its views to Waxman via its radio stations; Waxman wants to listen to those views on his radio; and the League of Women Voters wants a chance to convince Pacifica to take positions its members favor in its radio broadcasts.

All of these wants could be realized but for the fact that Pacifica receives public funds to finance its broadcasts. Because the Government subsidizes its broadcasts, a federal statute prohibits Pacifica from broadcasting its views — labeled as such — via the radio stations it operates. That statute now provides:

“No noncommercial educational broadcasting station which receives a grant from the Corporation under subpart C of this part may engage in editorializing. No noncommercial educational broadcasting station may support or oppose any candidate for public office.” 47 U.S.C. § 399.[1]

Although appellees originally challenged the validity of the entire statute, in their amended complaint they limited their attack to the prohibition against editorializing.[2] In its analysis

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of the case, the Court assumes that the ban on political endorsements is severable from the first section and that it may be constitutional.[3] In view of the fact that the major

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difference between the ban on political endorsements is based on the content of the speech, it is apparent that the entire rationale of the Court’s opinion rests on the premise that it may be permissible to predicate a statutory restriction on candidate endorsements on the difference between the content of that kind of speech and the content of other expressions of editorial opinion.

The Court does not tell us whether speech that endorses political candidates is more or less worthy of protection than other forms of editorializing, but it does iterate and reiterate the point that “the expression of editorial opinion” is a special kind of communication that “is entitled to the most exacting degree of First Amendment protection.” Ante, at 375-376; see also ante, at 380 n. 13, 381, 382, 383, and 384.[4]

Neither the fact that the statute regulates only one kind of speech, nor the fact that editorial opinion has traditionally been an important kind of speech, is sufficient to identify the character or the significance of the statute’s impact on speech. Three additional points are relevant. First, the statute does not prohibit Pacifica from expressing its opinion through any avenue except the radio stations for which it receives federal financial support. It eliminates the subsidized channel of communication as a forum for Pacifica itself, and thereby deprives Pacifica of an advantage it would otherwise have over other speakers, but it does not exclude Pacifica from the marketplace for ideas. Second, the statute does not curtail the expression of opinion by individual commentators

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who participate in Pacifica’s programs. The only comment that is prohibited as a statement that Pacifica agrees or disagrees with the opinions that others may express on its programs. Third, and of greatest significance for me, the statutory restriction is completely neutral in its operation — it prohibits all editorials without any distinction being drawn concerning the subject matter or the point of view that might be expressed.[5]

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II
The statute does not violate the fundamental principle that the citizen’s right to speak may not be conditioned upon the sovereign’s agreement with what the speaker intends to say.[6]
On the contrary, the statute was enacted in order to protect that very principle — to avoid the risk that some speakers will be rewarded or penalized for saying things that appeal to — or are offensive to — the sovereign.[7] The interests the statute

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is designed to protect are interests that underlie the First Amendment itself.

In my judgment the interest in keeping the Federal Government out of the propaganda arena is of overriding importance. That interest is of special importance in the field of electronic communication, not only because that medium is so powerful and persuasive, but also because it is the one form of communication that is licensed by the Federal Government.[8]
When the Government already has great potential

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power over the electronic media, it is surely legitimate to enact statutory safeguards to make sure that it does not cross the threshold that separates neutral regulation from the subsidy of partisan opinion.

The Court does not question the validity of the basic interests served by § 399. See ante, at 386. Instead, it suggests that the statute does not substantially serve those interests because the Public Broadcasting Act operates in many other respects to insulate local stations from governmental interference. See ante, at 388-390. In my view, that is an indication of nothing more than the strength of the governmental interest involved here — Congress enacted many safeguards because the evil to be avoided was so grave. Organs of official propaganda are antithetical to this Nation’s heritage, and Congress understandably acted with great caution in this area.[9] It is no answer to say that the other statutory provisions “substantially reduce the risk of governmental interference with the editorial judgments of local stations without restricting those stations’ ability to speak on matters of public concern.” Ante, at 390. The other safeguards protect the stations from interference with judgments that they will necessarily make in selecting programming, but those judgments are relatively amorphous. No safeguard is foolproof; and the fact that funds are dispensed according to largely “objective” criteria certainly is no guarantee. Individuals must always make judgments in allocating funds, and pressure can be exerted in subtle ways as well as through outright fund-cutoffs.

Members of Congress, not members of the Judiciary, live in the world of politics. When they conclude that there is a real danger of political considerations influencing the dispensing of this money and that this provision is necessary to insulate grantees from political pressures in addition to the other safeguards, that judgment is entitled to our respect.

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The magnitude of the present danger that the statute is designed to avoid is admittedly a matter about which reasonable judges may disagree.[10] Moreover, I would agree that the risk would be greater if other statutory safeguards were removed. It remains true, however, that Congress has the power to prevent the use of public funds to subsidize the expression of partisan points of view, or to suppress the propagation of dissenting opinions. No matter how great or how small the immediate risk may be, there surely is more than a theoretical possibility that future grantees might be influenced by the ever present tie of the political purse strings, even if those strings are never actually pulled. “[O]ne who knows that he may dissent knows also that he somehow consents when he does not dissent.” H. Arendt, Crises of the Republic 88 (1972), citing 1 A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 419 (1945).[11]

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III
The Court describes the scope of § 399’s ban as being “defined solely on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech,” ante, at 383, and analogizes this case to the regulation of speech we condemned in Consolidated Edison Co. v Public Service Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530 (1989). This description reveals how the Court manipulates labels without perceiving the critical differences behind the two cases.

In Consolidate Edison the class of speakers that was affected by New York’s prohibition consisted of regulated public utilities that had been expressing their opinion on the issue of nuclear power by means of written statements inserted in their customers’ monthly bills. Although the scope of the prohibition was phrased in general terms and applied to a selected group of speakers, it was obviously directed at spokesmen for a particular point of view. The justification for the restriction was phrased in terms of the potential offensiveness of the utilities’ messages to their audiences. It was a classic case of a viewpoint-based prohibition.

In this case, however, although the regulation applies only to a defined class of noncommercial broadcast licensees, it is common ground that these licensees represent heterogeneous points of view.[12] There is simply no sensible basis for considering this regulations a viewpoint restriction — or, to use the Court’s favorite phrase, to condemn it as “content-based” — because it applies equally to station owners of all shades of opinion. Moreover, the justification for the prohibition is not based on the “offensiveness” of the messages in the sense that that term was used in Consolidated Edison. Here, it is true that taxpayers might find it offensive if their tax moneys were being used to subsidize the expression of editorial

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opinion with which they disagree, but it is the fact of the subsidy — not just the expression of the opinion — that legitimates this justification. Furthermore, and of greater importance, the principal justification for this prohibition is the overriding interest in forestalling the creation of propaganda organs for the Government.

I respectfully dissent.

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