Voisine v. United States, 579 U.S. ___ (2016)


Issues:

Opinion (Kagan)

Contents

NOTICE:?This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports.?Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.?C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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No. 14?10154

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STEPHEN L. VOISINE and WILLIAM E. ARMSTRONG, III, PETITIONERS v. UNITED STATES

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit

[June 27, 2016]

Justice Kagan delivered the opinion of the Court.

Federal law prohibits any person convicted of a ?misdemeanor crime of domestic violence? from possessing a firearm. 18 U.?S.?C. ?922(g)(9). That phrase is defined to include any misdemeanor committed against a domestic relation that necessarily involves the ?use . . . of physical force.? ?921(a)(33)(A). The question presented here is whether misdemeanor assault convictions for reckless (as contrasted to knowing or intentional) conduct trigger the statutory firearms ban. We hold that they do.

I

Congress enacted ?922(g)(9) some 20 years ago to ?close [a] dangerous loophole? in the gun control laws. United States v. Castleman, 572 U.?S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 2) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 555 U.?S. 415, 426 (2009) ). An existing provision already barred convicted felons from possessing firearms. See ?922(g)(1) (1994 ed.). But many perpetrators of domestic violence are charged with misdemeanors rather than felonies, notwithstanding the harmfulness of their conduct. See Castleman, 572 U.?S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). And ?[f]irearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly combination.? Hayes, 555 U.?S., at 427. Accordingly, Congress added ?922(g)(9) to prohibit any person convicted of a ?misdemeanor crime of domestic violence? from possessing any gun or ammunition with a connection to interstate commerce. And it defined that phrase, in ?921(a)(33)(A), to include a misdemeanor under federal, state, or tribal law, committed by a person with a specified domestic relationship with the victim, that ?has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force.?

Two Terms ago, this Court considered the scope of that definition in a case involving a conviction for a knowing or intentional assault. SeeCastleman, 572 U.?S., at ___?___ (slip op., at 4?13). In Castleman, we initially held that the word ?force? in ?921(a)(33)(A) bears its common-law meaning, and so is broad enough to include offensive touching. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 4). We then determined that ?the knowing or intentional application of [such] force is a ?use? of force.? Id., at ___ (slip op., at 13). But we expressly left open whether a reckless assault also qualifies as a ?use? of force?so that a misdemeanor conviction for such conduct would trigger ?922(g)(9)?s firearms ban. See id., at ___, n.?8 (slip op., at 11, n.?8). The two cases before us now raise that issue.

Petitioner Stephen Voisine pleaded guilty in 2004 to assaulting his girlfriend in violation of ?207 of the Maine Criminal Code, which makes it a misdemeanor to ?intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause[?] bodily injury or offensive physical contact to another person.? Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17?A, ?207(1)(A). Several years later, Voisine again found himself in legal trouble, this time for killing a bald eagle. See 16 U.?S.?C. ?668(a). While investigating that crime, law enforcement officers learned that Voisine owned a rifle. When a background check turned up his prior misdemeanor conviction, the Government charged him with violating 18 U.?S.?C. ?922(g)(9).1

Petitioner William Armstrong pleaded guilty in 2008 to assaulting his wife in violation of a Maine domestic violence law making it a misdemeanor to commit an assault prohibited by ?207 (the general statute under which Voisine was convicted) against a family or household member. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17?A, ?207?A(1)(A). A few years later, law enforcement officers searched Armstrong?s home as part of a narcotics investigation. They discovered six guns, plus a large quantity of ammunition. Like Voisine, Armstrong was charged under ?922(g)(9) for unlawfully possessing firearms.

Both men argued that they were not subject to ?922(g)(9)?s prohibition because their prior convictions (as the Government conceded) could have been based on reckless, rather than knowing or intentional, conduct. The District Court rejected those claims. Each petitioner then entered a guilty plea conditioned on the right to appeal the District Court?s ruling.

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the two convictions, holding that ?an offense with a mens rea of recklessness may qualify as a ?misdemeanor crime of violence? under ?922(g)(9).? United States v. Armstrong, 706 F.?3d 1, 4 (2013); see United States v.Voisine, 495 Fed. Appx. 101, 102 (2013) (per curiam). Voisine and Armstrong filed a joint petition for certiorari, and shortly after issuingCastleman, this Court (without opinion) vacated the First Circuit?s judgments and remanded the cases for further consideration in light of that decision. See Armstrong v. United States, 572 U.?S. ___ (2014). On remand, the Court of Appeals again upheld the convictions, on the same ground. See 778 F. 3d 176, 177 (2015).

We granted certiorari, 577 U.?S. ___ (2015), to resolve a Circuit split over whether a misdemeanor conviction for recklessly assaulting a domestic relation disqualifies an individual from possessing a gun under ?922(g)(9).2 ?We now affirm.

II

The issue before us is whether ?922(g)(9) applies to reckless assaults, as it does to knowing or intentional ones. To commit an assault recklessly is to take that action with a certain state of mind (or mens rea)?in the dominant formulation, to ?consciously disregard[?]? a substantial risk that the conduct will cause harm to another. ALI, Model Penal Code ?2.02(2)(c) (1962); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17?A, ?35(3) (Supp. 2015) (adopting that definition); see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.?S. 825 ?837 (1994) (noting that a person acts recklessly only when he disregards a substantial risk of harm ?of which he is aware?). For purposes of comparison, to commit an assault knowingly or intentionally (the latter, to add yet another adverb, sometimes called ?purposefully?) is to act with another state of mind respecting that act?s consequences?in the first case, to be ?aware that [harm] is practically certain? and, in the second, to have that result as a ?conscious object.? Model Penal Code ??2.02 (2)(a)?(b); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17?A, ??35(1)?(2).

Statutory text and background alike lead us to conclude that a reckless domestic assault qualifies as a ?misdemeanor crime of domestic violence? under ?922(g)(9). Congress defined that phrase to include crimes that necessarily involve the ?use .?.?. of physical force.? ?921(a)(33)(A). Reckless assaults, no less than the knowing or intentional ones we addressed in Castleman, satisfy that definition. Further, Congress enacted ?922(g)(9) in order to prohibit domestic abusers convicted under run-of-the-mill misdemeanor assault and battery laws from possessing guns. Because fully two-thirds of such state laws extend to recklessness, construing ?922(g)(9) to exclude crimes committed with that state of mind would substantially undermine the provision?s design.

A

Nothing in the word ?use??which is the only statutory language either party thinks relevant?indicates that ?922(g)(9) applies exclusively to knowing or intentional domestic assaults. Recall that under ?921(a)(33)(A), an offense counts as a ?misdemeanor crime of domestic violence? only if it has, as an element, the ?use? of force. Dictionaries consistently define the noun ?use? to mean the ?act of employing? something. Webster?s New International Dictionary 2806 (2d ed. 1954) (?[a]ct of employing anything?); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 2097 (2d ed. 1987) (?act of employing, using, or putting into service?); Black?s Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. 1990) (?[a]ct of employing,? ?application?).3 ?On that common understanding, the force involved in a qualifying assault must be volitional; an involuntary motion, even a powerful one, is not naturally described as an active employment of force. See Castleman, 572 U.?S., at ___ (slip op., at 13) (?[T]he word ?use? conveys the idea that the thing used (here, ?physical force?) has been made the user?s instrument? (some internal quotation marks omitted)). But the word ?use? does not demand that the person applying force have the purpose or practical certainty that it will cause harm, as compared with the understanding that it is substantially likely to do so. Or, otherwise said, that word is indifferent as to whether the actor has the mental state of intention, knowledge, or recklessness with respect to the harmful consequences of his volitional conduct.

Consider a couple of examples to see the ordinary meaning of the word ?use? in this context. If a person with soapy hands loses his grip on a plate, which then shatters and cuts his wife, the person has not ?use[d]? physical force in common parlance. But now suppose a person throws a plate in anger against the wall near where his wife is standing. That hurl counts as a ?use? of force even if the husband did not know for certain (or have as an object), but only recognized a substantial risk, that a shard from the plate would ricochet and injure his wife. Similarly, to spin out a scenario discussed at oral argument, if a person lets slip a door that he is trying to hold open for his girlfriend, he has not actively employed (?used?) force even though the result is to hurt her. But if he slams the door shut with his girlfriend following close behind, then he has done so?regardless of whether he thinks it absolutely sure or only quite likely that he will catch her fingers in the jamb. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 10?11 (counsel for petitioners acknowledging that this example involves ?the use of physical force?). Once again, the word ?use? does not exclude from ?922(g)(9)?s compass an act of force carried out in conscious disregard of its substantial risk of causing harm.

And contrary to petitioners? view, nothing in Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.?S. 1 (2004) , suggests a different conclusion?i.e., that ?use? marks a dividing line between reckless and knowing conduct. See Brief for Petitioners 18?22. In that decision, this Court addressed a statutory definition similar to ?921(a)(33)(A): there, ?the use .?.?. of physical force against the person or property of another.? 18 U.?S.?C. ?16. That provision excludes ?merely accidental? conduct, Leocal held, because ?it is [not] natural to say that a person actively employs physical force against another person by accident.? 543 U.?S., at 9. For example, the Court stated, one ?would not ordinarily say a person ?use[s] .?.?. physical force against? another by stumbling and falling into him.? Ibid. That reasoning fully accords with our analysis here. Conduct like stumbling (or in our hypothetical, dropping a plate) is a true accident, and so too the injury arising from it; hence the difficulty of describing that conduct as the ?active employment? of force. Ibid. But the same is not true of reckless behavior?acts undertaken with awareness of their substantial risk of causing injury (in our contrasting hypo, hurling the plate). The harm such conduct causes is the result of a deliberate decision to endanger another?no more an ?accident? than if the ?substantial risk? were ?practically certain.? See supra, at 4 (comparing reckless and knowing acts). And indeed, Leocal itself recognized the distinction between accidents and recklessness, specifically reserving the issue whether the definition in ?16 embraces reckless conduct, see 543 U.?S., at 13?as we now hold ?921(a)(33)(A) does.4

In sum, Congress?s definition of a ?misdemeanor crime of violence? contains no exclusion for convictions based on reckless behavior. A person who assaults another recklessly ?use[s]? force, no less than one who carries out that same action knowingly or intentionally. The relevant text thus supports prohibiting petitioners, and others with similar criminal records, from possessing firearms.

B

So too does the relevant history. As explained earlier, Congress enacted ?922(g)(9) in 1996 to bar those domestic abusers convicted of garden-variety assault or battery misdemeanors?just like those convicted of felonies?from owning guns. See supra, at 1?2;Castleman, 572 U.?S., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 2, 6); Hayes, 555 U.?S., at 426?427. Then, as now, a significant majority of jurisdictions?34 States plus the District of Columbia?defined such misdemeanor offenses to include the reckless infliction of bodily harm. See Brief for United States 7a?19a (collecting statutes). That agreement was no coincidence. Sev-eral decades earlier, the Model Penal Code had taken the position that a mens rea of recklessness should generally suffice to establish criminal liability, including for assault. See ?2.02(3), Comments 4?5, at 243?244 (?purpose, knowledge, and recklessness are properly the basis for? such liability); ?211.1 (defining assault to include ?purposely, knowingly, or recklessly caus[ing] bodily injury?). States quickly incorporated that view into their misdemeanor assault and battery statutes. So in linking ?922(g)(9) to those laws, Congress must have known it was sweeping in some persons who had engaged in reckless conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238, 256 (1835) (Story, J.) (?Congress must be presumed to have legislated under this known state of the laws?). And indeed, that was part of the point: to apply firearms restrictions to those abusers, along with all others, whom the States? ordinary misdemeanor assault laws covered.

What is more, petitioners? reading risks rendering ?922(g)(9) broadly inoperative in the 35 jurisdictions with assault laws extending to recklessness?that is, inapplicable even to persons who commit that crime knowingly or intentionally. Consider Maine?s statute, which (in typical fashion) makes it a misdemeanor to ?intentionally, knowingly or recklessly? injure another. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17?A, ?207(1)(A). Assuming that provision defines a single crime (which happens to list alternative mental states)?and accepting petitioners? view that ?921(a)(33)(A) requires at least a knowing mens rea?then, under Descamps v. United States, 570 U.?S. ___ (2013), no conviction obtained under Maine?s statute could qualify as a ?misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.? See id., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (If a state crime ?sweeps more broadly? than the federally defined one, a conviction for the state offense ?cannot count? as a predicate, no matter what mens rea the defendant actually had). So in the 35 jurisdictions like Maine, petitioners? reading risks allowing domestic abusers of all mental states to evade ?922(g)(9)?s firearms ban. In Castleman, we declined to construe ?921(a)(33)(A) so as to render ?922(g)(9) ineffective in 10 States. See 572 U.?S., at ___ (slip op., at 9). All the more so here, where petitioners? view would jeopardize ?922(g)(9)?s force in several times that many.

Petitioners respond that we should ignore the assault and battery laws actually on the books when Congress enacted ?922(g)(9). In construing the statute, they urge, we should look instead to how the common law defined those crimes in an earlier age. See Brief for Petitioners 13?15. And that approach, petitioners claim, would necessitate reversing their convictions because the common law ?required a mens rea greater than recklessness.? Id., at 17.

But we see no reason to wind the clock back so far. Once again: Congress passed ?922(g)(9) to take guns out of the hands of abusers convicted under the misdemeanor assault laws then in general use in the States. See supra, at 1?2, 8. And by that time, a substantial majority of jurisdictions, following the Model Penal Code?s lead, had abandoned the common law?s approach to mens rea in drafting and interpreting their assault and battery statutes. Indeed, most had gone down that road decades before. That was the backdrop against which Congress was legislating. Nothing suggests that, in enacting ?922(g)(9), Congress wished to look beyond that real world to a common-law precursor that had largely expired. To the contrary, such an approach would have undermined Congress?s aim by tying the ban on firearms possession not to the laws under which abusers are prosecuted but instead to a legal anachronism.5

And anyway, we would not know how to resolve whether recklessness sufficed for a battery conviction at common law. Recklessness was not a word in the common law?s standard lexicon, nor an idea in its conceptual framework; only in the mid- to late-1800?s did courts begin to address reckless behavior in those terms. See Hall, Assault and Battery by the Reckless Motorist, 31 J. Crim. L. & C. 133, 138?139 (1940). The common law traditionally used a variety of overlapping and, frankly, confusing phrases to describe culpable mental states?among them, specific intent, general intent, presumed intent, willfulness, and malice. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.?S. 246, 252 (1952) ; Model Penal Code ?2.02, Comment 1, at 230. Whether and where conduct that we would today describe as reckless fits into that obscure scheme is anyone?s guess: Neither petitioners? citations, nor the Government?s competing ones, have succeeded in resolving that counterfactual question. And that indeterminacy confirms our conclusion that Congress had no thought of incorporating the common law?s treatment of mens rea into ?921(a)(33)(A). That provision instead corresponds to the ordinary misdemeanor assault and battery laws used to prosecute domestic abuse, regardless of how their mental state requirements might?or, then again, might not?conform to the common law?s.6

III

The federal ban on firearms possession applies to any person with a prior misdemeanor conviction for the ?use .?.?. of physical force? against a domestic relation. ?921(a)(33)(A). That language, naturally read, encompasses acts of force undertaken recklessly?i.e., with conscious disregard of a substantial risk of harm. And the state-law backdrop to that provision, which included misdemeanor assault statutes covering reckless conduct in a significant majority of jurisdictions, indicates that Congress meant just what it said. Each petitioner?s possession of a gun, following a conviction under Maine law for abusing a domestic partner, therefore violates ?922(g)(9). We accordingly affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.

Footnotes

1. ?In United States v. Hayes, 555 U.?S. 415, 418 (2009) , this Court held that a conviction under a general assault statute like ?207 (no less than one under a law targeting only domestic assault) can serve as the predicate offense for a ?922(g)(9) prosecution. When that is so, the Government must prove in the later, gun possession case that the perpetrator and the victim of the assault had one of the domestic relationships specified in ?921(a)(33)(A). See id., at 426.
2. ?Compare 778 F.?3d 176 (CA1 2015) (case below) with United States v. Nobriga, 474 F.?3d 561 (CA9 2006) (per curiam) (holding that a conviction for a reckless domestic assault does not trigger ?922(g)(9)?s ban).
3. ?In cases stretching back over a century, this Court has followed suit, although usually discussing the verb form of the word. See, e.g.,Bailey v. United States, 516 U.?S. 137, 145 (1995) (to use means ???[t]o convert to one?s service,? ?to employ,? [or] ?to avail oneself of???);Smith v. United States, 508 U.?S. 223, 229 (1993) (to use means ???[t]o convert to one?s service? or ?to employ???); Astor v. Merritt, 111 U.?S. 202, 213 (1884) (to use means ?to employ [or] to derive service from?).
4. ?Like Leocal, our decision today concerning ?921(a)(33)(A)?s scope does not resolve whether ?16 includes reckless behavior. Courts have sometimes given those two statutory definitions divergent readings in light of differences in their contexts and purposes, and we do not foreclose that possibility with respect to their required mental states. Cf. United States v. Castleman, 572 U.?S. ___, ___, n.?4 (2014) (slip op., at 6, n.?4) (interpreting ?force? in ?921(a)(33)(A) to encompass any offensive touching, while acknowledging that federal appeals courts have usually read the same term in ?16 to reach only ?violent force?). All we say here is that Leocal?s exclusion of accidental conduct from a definition hinging on the ?use? of force is in no way inconsistent with our inclusion of reckless conduct in a similarly worded provision.
5. ?As petitioners observe, this Court looked to the common law in Castleman to define the term ?force? in ?921(a)(33)(A). See 572 U.?S., at ___?___ (slip op., at 4?5); Brief for Petitioners 13?15. But we did so for reasons not present here. ?Force,? we explained, was ?a common-law term of art? with an ?established common-law meaning.? 572 U.?S., at ___ (slip op., at 5) (internal quotation marks omitted). And we thought that Congress meant to adhere to that meaning given its ?perfect[?]? fit with ?922(g)(9)?s goal. Ibid. By contrast, neither party pretends that the statutory term ?use??the only one identified as potentially relevant here?has any particular common-law definition. And as explained above, the watershed change in how state legislatures thought of mens rea after the Model Penal Code makes the common law a bad match for the ordinary misdemeanor assault and battery statutes in Congress?s sightline.
6. ?Petitioners make two last arguments for reading ?921(a)(33)(A) their way, but they do not persuade us. First, petitioners contend that we should adopt their construction to avoid creating a question about whether the Second Amendment permits imposing a lifetime firearms ban on a person convicted of a misdemeanor involving reckless conduct. See Brief for Petitioners 32?36. And second, petitioners assert that the rule of lenity requires accepting their view. See id., at 31?32. But neither of those arguments can succeed if the statute is clear. See Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.?S. 206, 212 (1998) (noting that ?the doctrine of constitutional doubt .?.?. enters in only where a statute is susceptible of two constructions? (internal quotation marks omitted)); Abramski v. United States, 573 U.?S. ___, ___, n. 10 (2014) (slip op., at 18, n.?10) (stating that the rule of lenity applies only in cases of genuine ambiguity). And as we have shown, ?921(a)(33)(A) plainly encompasses reckless assaults.