Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U. S. ____ (2016)


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Opinion

Contents

577 U.?S. ____ (2016)

NOTICE:?This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports.?Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.?C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

No. 14-857

CAMPBELL-EWALD COMPANY, PETITIONER
v. JOSE GOMEZ

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[January 20, 2016]

 

JUSTICE GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

Is an unaccepted offer to satisfy the named plaintiff’s individual claim sufficient to render a case moot when the complaint seeks relief on behalf of the plaintiff and a class of persons similarly situated? This question, on which Courts of Appeals have divided, was reserved in Genesis HealthCare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.?S. ___, ___, ___, n.?4 (2013) (slip op., at 5, 6, n.?4). We hold today, in accord with Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that an unaccepted settlement offer has no force. Like other unaccepted contract offers, it creates no lasting right or obligation. With the offer off the table, and the defendant’s continuing denial of liability, adversity between the parties persists.

This case presents a second question. The claim in suit concerns performance of the petitioner’s contract with the Federal Government. Does the sovereign’s immunity from suit shield the petitioner, a private enterprise, as well? We hold that the petitioner’s status as a Government contractor does not entitle it to “derivative sovereign immunity,” i.e., the blanket immunity enjoyed by the sovereign.

I

?????The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA or Act) 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.?S.?C. ?227(b)(1)(A)(iii), prohibits any person, absent the prior express consent of a telephone-call recipient, from “mak[ing] any call .?.?. using any automatic telephone dialing system .?.?. to any telephone number assigned to a paging service [or] cellular telephone service.” A text message to a cellular telephone, it is undisputed, qualifies as a “call” within the compass of ?227(b)(1)(A)(iii). 768 F. 3d 871, 874 (CA9 2014). For damages occasioned by conduct violating the TCPA, ?227(b)(3) authorizes a private right of action. A plaintiff successful in such an action may recover her “actual monetary loss” or $500 for each violation, “whichever is greater.” Damages may be trebled if “the defendant willfully or knowingly violated” the Act.

Petitioner Campbell-Ewald Company (Campbell) is a nationwide advertising and marketing communications agency. Beginning in 2000, the United States Navy engaged Campbell to develop and execute a multimedia recruiting campaign. In 2005 and 2006, Campbell proposed to the Navy a campaign involving text messages sent to young adults, the Navy’s target audience, encouraging them to learn more about the Navy. The Navy approved Campbell’s proposal, conditioned on sending the messages only to individuals who had “opted in” to receipt of marketing solicitations on topics that included service in the Navy. App. 42. In final form, the message read:

“Destined for something big? Do it in the Navy. Get a career. An education. And a chance to serve a greater cause. For a FREE Navy video call [?phone number].” 768 F.?3d, at 873.

Campbell then contracted with Mindmatics LLC, which generated a list of cellular phone numbers geared to the Navy’s target audience–namely, cellular phone users between the ages of 18 and 24 who had consented to receiving solicitations by text message. In May 2006, Mindmatics transmitted the Navy’s message to over 100,000 recipients.

Respondent Jose Gomez was a recipient of the Navy’s recruiting message. Alleging that he had never consented to receiving the message, that his age was nearly 40, and that Campbell had violated the TCPA by sending the message (and perhaps others like it), Gomez filed a class-action complaint in the District Court for the Central District of California in 2010. On behalf of a nationwide class of individuals who had received, but had not consented to receipt of, the text message, Gomez sought treble statutory damages, costs, and attorney’s fees, also an injunction against Campbell’s involvement in unsolicited messaging. App. 16-24.

Prior to the agreed-upon deadline for Gomez to file a motion for class certification, Campbell proposed to settle Gomez’s individual claim and filed an offer of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. App. to Pet. for Cert. 52a-61a.1 ?Campbell offered to pay Gomez his costs, excluding attorney’s fees, and $1,503 per message for the May 2006 text message and any other text message Gomez could show he had received, thereby satisfying his personal treble-damages claim. Id., at 53a. Campbell also proposed a stipulated injunction in which it agreed to be barred from sending text messages in violation of the TCPA. The proposed injunction, however, denied liability and the allegations made in the complaint, and disclaimed the existence of grounds for the imposition of an injunction. Id., at 56a. The settlement offer did not include attorney’s fees, Campbell observed, because the TCPA does not provide for an attorney’s-fee award. Id., at 53a. Gomez did not accept the settlement offer and allowed Campbell’s Rule 68 submission to lapse after the time, 14 days, specified in the Rule.

Campbell thereafter moved to dismiss the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. No Article III case or controversy remained, Campbell urged, because its offer mooted Gomez’s individual claim by providing him with complete relief. Gomez had not moved for class certification before his claim became moot, Campbell added, so the putative class claims also became moot. The District Court denied Campbell’s motion. 805 F.?Supp. 2d 923 (CD Cal. 2011).2 ?Gomez was not dilatory in filing his certification request, the District Court determined; consequently, the court noted, the class claims would “relat[e] back” to the date Gomez filed the complaint. Id., at 930-931.

After limited discovery, Campbell moved for summary judgment on a discrete ground. The U.?S. Navy enjoys the sovereign’s immunity from suit under the TCPA, Campbell argued. The District Court granted the motion. Relying on our decision in Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.?S. 18 (1940), the court held that, as a contractor acting on the Navy’s behalf, Campbell acquired the Navy’s immunity. No. CV 10-02007DMG (CD Cal., Feb. 22, 2013), App. to Pet. for Cert. 22a-34a, 2013 WL 655237.?????The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment entered for Campbell. 768 F.?3d 871. The appeals court disagreed with the District Court’s ruling on the immunity issue, but agreed that Gomez’s case remained live. Concerning Gomez’s individual claim, the Court of Appeals relied on its then-recent decision in Diaz v. First American Home Buyers Protection Corp., 732 F.?3d 948 (2013). Diaz held that “an unaccepted Rule 68 offer that would fully satisfy a plaintiff’s [individual] claim is insufficient to render th[at] claim moot.” Id., at 950. As to the class relief Gomez sought, the Ninth Circuit held that “an unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment–for the full amount of the named plaintiff’s individual claim and made before the named plaintiff files a motion for class certification–does not moot a class action.” 768 F.?3d, at 875 (quoting Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.?3d 1081, 1091-1092 (CA9 2011)).

Next, the Court of Appeals held that Campbell was not entitled to “derivative sovereign immunity” under this Court’s decision in Yearsley or on any other basis. 768 F. 3d, at 879-881. Vacating the District Court’s judgment, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings.3

We granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement among the Courts of Appeals over whether an unaccepted offer can moot a plaintiff’s claim, thereby depriving federal courts of Article III jurisdiction. Compare Bais Yaakov v. Act, Inc., 798 F. 3d 46, 52 (CA1 2015); Hooks v. Landmark Industries, Inc., 797 F. 3d 309, 315 (CA5 2015); Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F. 3d 783, 787 (CA7 2015); Tanasi v. New Alliance Bank, 786 F. 3d 195, 200 (CA2 2015); Stein v. Buccaneers Limited Partnership, 772 F. 3d 698, 703 (CA11 2014); Diaz, 732 F.?3d, at 954-955 (holding that an unaccepted offer does not render a plaintiff’s claim moot), with Warren v. Sessoms & Rogers, P. A., 676 F. 3d 365, 371 (CA4 2012); O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., 575 F. 3d 567, 574-575 (CA6 2009); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F. 3d 337, 340 (CA3 2004) (holding that an unaccepted offer can moot a plaintiff’s claim). We granted review as well to resolve the federal contractor immunity question Campbell’s petition raised. 575 U.?S. ___ (2015).

II

?????Article III of the Constitution limits federal-court jurisdiction to “cases” and “controversies.” U.?S. Const., Art.?III, ?2. We have interpreted this requirement to demand that “an actual controversy .?.?. be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.?S. 43, 67 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.?S. 395, 401 (1975)). “If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit,’ at any point during litigation, the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.” Genesis HealthCare Corp., 569 U.?S., at ___ (slip op., at 4) (quotingLewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.?S. 472, 477-478 (1990)). A case becomes moot, however, “only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief what-ever to the prevailing party.” Knox v. Service Employees, 567 U.?S. ___, ___ (2012) (slip op., at 7) (internal quotation marks omitted). “As long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small, in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.?S. ___, ___ (2013) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Genesis HealthCare, the Court considered a collective action brought by Laura Symczyk, a former employee of Genesis HealthCare Corp. Symczyk sued on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees for alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.?S.?C. ?201 et?seq. In that case, as here, the defendant served the plaintiff with an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 that would have satisfied the plaintiff’s individual dam-ages claim. 569 U.?S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). Also as here, the plaintiff allowed the offer to lapse by failing to respond within the time specified in the Rule. Ibid. But unlike the case Gomez mounted, Symczyk did not dispute in the lower courts that Genesis HealthCare’s offer mooted her individual claim. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 5). Because of that failure, the Genesis HealthCare majority refused to rule on the issue. Instead, the majority simply assumed, without deciding, that an offer of complete relief pursuant to Rule 68, even if unaccepted, moots a plaintiff’s claim. Ibid. Having made that assumption, the Court proceeded to consider whether the action remained justiciable on the basis of the collective-action allegations alone. Absent a plaintiff with a live individual case, the Court concluded, the suit could not be maintained. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6).

JUSTICE KAGAN, writing in dissent, explained that she would have reached the threshold question and would have held that “an unaccepted offer of judgment cannot moot a case.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3). She reasoned:

“When a plaintiff rejects such an offer–however good the terms–her interest in the lawsuit remains just what it was before. And so too does the court’s ability to grant her relief. An unaccepted settlement offer–like any unaccepted contract offer–is a legal nullity, with no operative effect. As every first-year law student learns, the recipient’s rejection of an offer ‘leaves the matter as if no offer had ever been made.’ Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Columbus Rolling Mill, 119 U.?S. 149, 151 (1886). Nothing in Rule 68 alters that basic principle; to the contrary, that rule specifies that ‘[a]n unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn.’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 68(b). So assuming the case was live before–because the plaintiff had a stake and the court could grant relief–the litigation carries on, unmooted.” Ibid.

We now adopt JUSTICE KAGAN’s analysis, as has every Court of Appeals ruling on the issue post Genesis HealthCare.4 ?Accordingly, we hold that Gomez’s complaint was not effaced by Campbell’s unaccepted offer to satisfy his individual claim.

As earlier recounted, see supra, at 3-4, Gomez commenced an action against Campbell for violation of the TCPA, suing on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. Gomez sought treble statutory damages and an injunction on behalf of a nationwide class, but Campbell’s settlement offer proposed relief for Gomez alone, and it did not admit liability. App. to Pet. for Cert. 58a. Gomez rejected Campbell’s settlement terms and the offer of judgment.

Under basic principles of contract law, Campbell’s settlement bid and Rule 68 offer of judgment, once rejected, had no continuing efficacy. See Genesis HealthCare, 569 U.?S., at ___ (KAGAN, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 3). Absent Gomez’s acceptance, Campbell’s settlement offer remained only a proposal, binding neither Campbell nor Gomez. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 59a (“Please advise whether Mr. Gomez will accept [Campbell’s] offer .?.?.?.”). Having rejected Campbell’s settlement bid, and given Campbell’s continuing denial of liability, Gomez gained no entitlement to the relief Campbell previously offered. See Eliason v. Henshaw, 4 Wheat. 225, 228 (1819) (“It is an undeniable principle of the law of contracts, that an offer of a bargain by one person to another, imposes no obligation upon the former, until it is accepted by the latter .?.?.?.”). In short, with no settlement offer still operative, the parties remained adverse; both retained the same stake in the litigation they had at the outset.

The Federal Rule in point, Rule 68, hardly supports the argument that an unaccepted settlement offer can moot a complaint. An offer of judgment, the Rule provides, “is considered withdrawn” if not accepted within 14 days of its service. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 68(a), (b). The sole built-in sanction: “If the [ultimate] judgment .?.?. is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.” Rule 68(d).

In urging that an offer of judgment can render a controversy moot, Campbell features a trio of 19th-century railroad tax cases: California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U.?S. 308 (1893), Little v. Bowers, 134 U.?S. 547 (1890), and San Mateo County v. Southern Pacific R. Co., 116 U.?S. 138 (1885). None of those decisions suggests that an unaccepted settlement offer can put a plaintiff out of court. In San Pablo, California had sued to recover state and county taxes due from a railroad. In response, the railroad had not merely offered to pay the taxes in question. It had actually deposited the full amount demanded in a California bank in the State’s name, in accord with a California statute that “extinguished” the railroad’s tax obligations upon such payment. 149 U.?S., at 313-314. San Pablo thus rested on California’s substantive law, which required the State to accept a taxpayer’s full payment of the amount in controversy. San Mateo and Little similarly involved actual payment of the taxes for which suit was brought. In all three cases, the railroad’s payments had fully satisfied the asserted tax claims, and so extinguished them. San Mateo, 116 U.?S., at 141-142; Little, 134 U.?S., at 556.5

In contrast to the cases Campbell highlights, when the settlement offer Campbell extended to Gomez expired, Gomez remained emptyhanded; his TCPA complaint, which Campbell opposed on the merits, stood wholly unsatisfied. Because Gomez’s individual claim was not made moot by the expired settlement offer, that claim would retain vitality during the time involved in determining whether the case could proceed on behalf of a class. While a class lacks independent status until certified, see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.?S. 393, 399 (1975), a would-be class representative with a live claim of her own must be accorded a fair opportunity to show that certification is warranted.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s dissent asserts that our decision transfers authority from the federal courts and “hands it to the plaintiff.” Post, at 10. Quite the contrary. The dissent’s approach would place the defendant in the driver’s seat. We encountered a kindred strategy in U.?S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.?S. 18 (1994). The parties in Bancorp had reached a voluntary settlement while the case was pending before this Court. Id., at 20. The petitioner then sought vacatur of the Court of Appeals’ judgment, contending that it should be relieved from the adverse decision on the ground that the settlement made the dispute moot. The Court rejected this gambit. Id., at 25. Similarly here, Campbell sought to avoid a potential adverse decision, one that could expose it to damages a thousand-fold larger than the bid Gomez declined to accept.

In sum, an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiff’s case, so the District Court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate Gomez’s complaint. That ruling suffices to decide this case. We need not, and do not, now decide whether the result would be different if a defendant deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that amount. That question is appropriately reserved for a case in which it is not hypothetical.

III

?????The second question before us is whether Campbell’s status as a federal contractor renders it immune from suit for violating the TCPA by sending text messages to unconsenting recipients. The United States and its agencies, it is undisputed, are not subject to the TCPA’s prohibitions because no statute lifts their immunity. Brief for Peti-tioner 2; Brief for Respondent 43. Do federal contractors share the Government’s unqualified immunity from liability and litigation? We hold they do not.

“[G]overnment contractors obtain certain immunity in connection with work which they do pursuant to their contractual undertakings with the United States.” Brady v. Roosevelt S.?S. Co., 317 U.?S. 575, 583 (1943). That immunity, however, unlike the sovereign’s, is not absolute. See id., at 580-581. Campbell asserts “derivative sovereign immunity,” Brief for Petitioner 35, but can offer no authority for the notion that private persons performing Government work acquire the Government’s embracive immunity. When a contractor violates both federal law and the Government’s explicit instructions, as here alleged, no “derivative immunity” shields the contractor from suit by persons adversely affected by the violation.

Campbell urges that two of our decisions support its “derivative immunity” defense: Yearsley, 309 U.?S. 18, and Filarsky v. Delia, 566 U.?S. ___ (2012). In Yearsley, a landowner asserted a claim for damages against a private company whose work building dikes on the Missouri River pursuant to its contract with the Federal Government had washed away part of the plaintiff’s land. We held that the contractor was not answerable to the landowner. “[T]he work which the contractor had done in the river bed,” we observed, “was all authorized and directed by the Government of the United States” and “performed pursuant to the Act of Congress.” 309 U.?S., at 20(internal quotation marks omitted). Where the Government’s “authority to carry out the project was validly conferred, that is, if what was done was within the constitutional power of Congress,” we explained, “there is no liability on the part of the contractor” who simply performed as the Government directed. Id., at 20-21.6 ?The Court contrasted with Yearsley cases in which a Government agent had “exceeded his authority” or the authority “was not validly conferred”; in those circumstances, the Court said, the agent could be held liable for conduct causing injury to another. Id., at 21.7

In Filarsky, we considered whether a private attorney temporarily retained by a municipal government as an investigator could claim qualified immunity in an action brought under 42 U.?S.?C. ?1983. Finding no distinction in the common law “between public servants and private individuals engaged in public service,” we held that the investigator could assert “qualified immunity” in the lawsuit. 566 U.?S., at ___, ___ (slip op., at 8, 5). Qualified immunity reduces the risk that contractors will shy away from government work. But the doctrine is bounded in a way that Campbell’s “derivative immunity” plea is not. “Qualified immunity may be overcome .?.?. if the defendant knew or should have known that his conduct violated a right ‘clearly established’ at the time of the episode in suit.” Id., at ___ (GINSBURG, J., concurring) (slip op., at 1) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.?S. 800, 818 (1982)). Campbell does not here contend that the TCPA’s requirements or the Navy’s instructions failed to qualify as “clearly established.”

At the pretrial stage of litigation, we construe the record in a light favorable to the party seeking to avoid summary disposition, here, Gomez. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.?S. 574, 587 (1986). In opposition to summary judgment, Gomez presented evidence that the Navy authorized Campbell to send text messages only to individuals who had “opted in” to receive solicitations. App. 42-44; 768 F.?3d, at 874. A Navy representative noted the importance of ensuring that the message recipient list be “kosher” (i.e., that all recipients had consented to receiving messages like the recruiting text), and made clear that the Navy relied on Campbell’s representation that the list was in compliance. App. 43. See also ibid. (noting that Campbell itself encouraged the Navy to use only an opt-in list in order to meet national and local law requirements). In short, the current record reveals no basis for arguing that Gomez’s right to remain message-free was in doubt or that Campbell complied with the Navy’s instructions.

We do not overlook that subcontractor Mindmatics, not Campbell, dispatched the Navy’s recruiting message to unconsenting recipients. But the Federal Communications Commission has ruled that, under federal common-law principles of agency, there is vicarious liability for TCPA violations. In re Joint Petition Filed by Dish Network, LLC, 28 FCC Rcd. 6574 (2013). The Ninth Circuit deferred to that ruling, 768 F.?3d, at 878, and we have no cause to question it. Campbell’s vicarious liability for Mindmatics’ conduct, however, in no way advances Campbell’s contention that it acquired the sovereign’s immunity from suit based on its contract with the Navy.

*??*??*

?????For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

FOOTNOTES

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 provides, in relevant part:

“(a) Making an Offer; Judgment on an Accepted Offer. At least 14 days before the date set for trial, a party defending against a claim may serve on an opposing party an offer to allow judgment on specified terms, with the costs then accrued. If, within 14 days after being served, the opposing party serves written notice accepting the offer, either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance, plus proof of service. The clerk must then enter judgment.

“(b) Unaccepted Offer. An unaccepted offer is considered withdrawn, but it does not preclude a later offer. Evidence of an unaccepted offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs.

.?????.?????.?????.?????.

(d) Paying Costs After an Unaccepted Offer. If the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is not more favorable than the un-accepted offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the offer was made.”

2. Because Campbell had already answered the complaint, the District Court construed Campbell’s motion as a request for summary judgment. 805 F.?Supp. 2d, at 927, n.?2.

3. The Court of Appeals stayed its mandate pending proceedings in this Court. App. to Pet. for Cert. 62a-63a.

4. See Bais Yaakov v. Act, Inc., 798 F. 3d 46, 51-52 (CA1 2015); Hooks v. Landmark Industries, Inc., 797 F. 3d 309, 314-315 (CA5 2015); Chapman v. First Index, Inc., 796 F. 3d 783, 786-787 (CA7 2015); Tanasi v. New Alliance Bank, 786 F. 3d 195, 199-200 (CA2 2015); Stein v. Buccaneers Limited Partnership, 772 F. 3d 698, 702-703 (CA11 2014); Diaz v. First American Home Buyers Corp., 732 F. 3d 948, 953-955 (CA9 2013).

5. In addition to California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U.?S. 308 (1893), THE CHIEF JUSTICE maintains, two recent decisions of the Court support its position: Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.?S. 87 (2009), and Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.?S. ___ (2013). See post, at 6-9 (dissenting opinion). The Court’s reasoning in those opinions, however, is consistent with our decision in this case. In Alvarez, the Court found moot claims for injunctive and declaratory relief in relation to cars and cash seized by the police. Through separate state-court proceedings, the State had “returned all the cars that it seized,” and the plaintiff-property owners had “either forfeited any relevant cash or ha[d] accepted as final the State’s return of some of it.” 558 U.?S., at 89, 95-96. Alvarez thus resembles the railroad tax cases described above: The Alvarez plaintiffs had in fact received all the relief they could claim, all “underlying property disputes” had ended, id., at 89, and as the complaint sought “only declaratory and injunctive relief, not damages,” id., at 92, no continuing controversy remained.

Already concerned a trademark owned by Nike. Already sought a declaratory judgment invalidating the trademark. The injury Already asserted was the ongoing threat that Nike would sue for trademark infringement. In response to Already’s claim, Nike filed a “Covenant Not to Sue,” in which it promised not to bring any trademark claims based on Already’s existing or similar footwear designs. 568 U.?S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). The Court found this covenant sufficient to overcome the rule that “voluntary cessation” is generally inadequate to moot a claim. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 6). True, Nike’s covenant was unilateral, but it afforded Already blanket protection from future trademark litigation. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 8). The risk that underpinned Already’s standing–the Damocles’ sword of a trademark infringement suit–thus ceased to exist given Nike’s embracive promise not to sue. In short, in both Alvarez and Already, the plaintiffs had received full redress for the injuries asserted in their complaints. Here, by contrast, Campbell’s revocable offer, far from providing Gomez the relief sought in his complaint, gave him nary a penny.

6. If there had been a taking of the plaintiff’s property, the Court noted, “a plain and adequate remedy” would be at hand, i.e., recovery from the United States of “just compensation.” Yearsley, 309 U.?S., at 21.

7. We disagree with the Court of Appeals to the extent that it described Yearsley as “establish[ing] a narrow rule regarding claims arising out of property damage caused by public works projects.” 768 F.?3d, at 879. Critical in Yearsley was not the involvement of public works, but the contractor’s performance in compliance with all federal directions.